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Introduction
In The Case for Animal Rights, first published in 1983, Tom Regan offers a deontological
approach to dealing with the problem of the moral status of animals. This is in contrast to Peter Singer's
famous utilitarian account in his book Animal Liberation from 1975. While Singer's is the most wellknown utilitarian account of animal liberation, Regan's position is the most the most well-known rightsbased account. Regan claims that the morally significant characteristic uniting humans with many nonhuman animals is that they are “subjects-of-a-life” with inherent value.1 All individuals with inherent
value, Regan argues, have a right not be treated as mere means; they have basic rights that ought to be
respected by moral agents.2
Simply establishing the basic rights of individuals does not provide us with adequate information
to know our moral obligations in every situation. Some moral situations do not involve rights –this
implies that a complete moral theory cannot be entirely rights based, and that we have duties aside from
those associated with rights. Simply referring to rights also does not help in situations when rights
conflict. An important task for theories involving moral rights thus involves determining whether it
would ever be acceptable to override rights, and if so, in which situations, and according to which
principles. Regan's theory has been criticized for various reasons, and one aspect that has been
extensively debated is his analysis of cases where rights may be overridden.
The role rights play in moral theories relates directly to the way that rights conflicts are resolved.
There are those who argue that if rights are to play any meaningful role, they must be thought to be
absolute; however, this view runs into practical problems as it does not further our ability to resolve
conflicts between rights. Rights function as a way to provide protection for individuals, but many agree
that an individual's right may be overridden in certain circumstances: when other rights, or other non-
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rights considerations conflict with it. When rights are not in conflict, moral decisions are simple – the
morally obligatory action is to respect rights. Ideally, we would never have to override a right and it
would be possible for all rights to be absolute, but since conflicts involving rights inevitably occur
according to most conceptions of rights, respecting all rights at all times may not be possible. Accepting
a view of rights where they are not absolutely respected means that although rights may hold the highest
of priority in our moral reasoning, at some point, we must switch to a different type of moral reasoning.
In any sort of moral conflict, we have moral reasons to do (or refrain from doing) two or more
actions that are not compossible. This means that whichever option we choose, something non-ideal
(some sort of bad consequence) will occur, even if we choose the morally best option. The justification
for doing something with bad consequences to rights holders is a more complicated type of moral
reasoning than simply ensuring we respect the rights of individuals. There is no consensus about how
conflicts involving rights ought to be resolved – even within the realm of human rights. Adding animals
as rights holders to a moral theory further complicates the issue.
Regan offers two principles to be used when we must choose to override some individuals' rights
not to be harmed: the minimize overriding of rights (miniride) principle and the worse-off principle.3
These principles for handling conflicts of rights are claimed to follow logically from the more
fundamental “respect principle.”4 However, it is the respect principle which establishes that individuals
have a prima facie right not to be harmed, while both the miniride and worse-off principles involve
choosing some individual(s) to be harmed.5 The principles for overriding rights therefore form a
different level of moral reasoning than the more fundamental principles. The fundamental principles of
the rights theory offer protection to individuals while the principles for overriding rights allow us to
break from this and harm individuals. Making the case that animals share the same basic rights as
humans and the handling of scenarios where rights conflict may be viewed as two separate projects that
3
4
5
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Regan is tackling in his account of animal rights. Disagreements about how to deal with conflicts need
not affect the acceptance of the idea that animals have rights. Even though there is no consensus on how
to resolve conflicts of human rights, it is widely believed that humans have some basic rights.
I agree with Regan that animals have basic rights, but I am not attempting to defend this view
here. For the purpose of this thesis, I assume the correctness of the more fundamental level of Regan's
theory. My goal is to address problems at the level where rights conflict, and to offer some solutions for
resolving conflicts that remain consistent with the fundamental principles.
In Chapter 1, I go over the foundations of Regan's rights theory, discussing key principles and
concepts, as well as some criticisms of these aspects. I will focus particularly on those criticisms that
have bearing on the problem of conflicting rights. The concept of inherent value is key to Regan's
theory, but it has been criticized as being an obscure or mysterious quality.6 Difficulties in determining a
cut-off point for those to include as having inherent value is another important source of controversy.7
Regan argues for including normal mammals aged one year or more as having inherent value, but
deliberately chooses a point at which he thinks we can be absolutely confident that those included have
it.8 He believes that there are actually more who do have inherent value, but leaves the matter of the true
cut-off point open for discussion and suggests that we err on the side of caution in attributing inherent
value to individuals.9 There are some objections to this approach though: that it is vague or that it could
result in unfulfillable moral duties.10
In Chapter 2, I discuss Regan's concept of rights and duties as well as some practical implications
of his animal rights theory. Regan is also criticized for not offering an account of all of our moral duties
within his theory of animal rights, though Regan himself admits his theory is incomplete; he states that

6 See Mary Anne Warren, “A Critique of Regan's Animal Rights Theory,” in Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and
Application 2005, ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth, 2005), 74.
7 For an example, see Warren, “A Critique...,” 75-76.
8 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, xvi.
9 Ibid., 391.
10 See Warren, “A Critique...,” 76.
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he intends only to establish certain principles which should be included in a complete moral theory.11
Some critics, however, have argued that even his account of our duties of justice (those associated with
basic rights) are inadequate.12
Chapter 3 deals with conflicts of rights. It explains various ways in which theories involving
rights may handle apparent conflicts between rights and other rights, or rights and other considerations.
Regan's theory involves prima facie rights which may be overridden in certain circumstances. I discuss
Regan's principles for overriding rights and some of their criticisms. In this chapter, I also discuss some
of the problems of prima facie views of rights in general.
Chapter 4 concerns Regan's controversial lifeboat case where an agent is forced to choose
between sacrificing a dog or one of four humans. Regan argues that his rights view would make
sacrificing the dog obligatory.13 I discuss some criticisms of his handling of this situation and conclude
that his methods for resolving the case are incompatible with the more fundamental principles of his
theory. I suggest that the situation has the form of an apparent dilemma, though I argue that genuine
moral dilemmas cannot exist in a prima facie system of rights, since in apparently dilemmatic situations,
we are not acting as moral agents. The decisions we make become practical, rather than moral problems
and any option becomes permissible. Random decision procedures are most appropriate in these
situations.
I argue that in light of these conclusions about dilemmas, and in order for Regan to remain
consistent, that in the lifeboat case, the option of saving any of the individuals is permissible, including
the dog, and that it would be wrong to make it obligatory to sacrifice any particular individual. My
suggestion about how to handle the lifeboat case has broader implications for the way we ought to think
about conflicts of rights and about the value of rights bearers in general. It also helps answer the

Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, xiii.
See Dale Jamieson, “Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance: A Critique of Regan's Theory of Animal Rights,”
Ethics 100, no. 2 (1990): 349.
13 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 324.
11
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question of what important, yet plausible role rights may play in an ethical theory. For Regan, the
important function of rights is that they protect individuals from non-rights considerations absolutely, as
well as restricting aggregative policies, so lesser rights may never be added to outweigh a more
important right. I suggest that if inherent value is to be taken seriously, another important feature of
basic rights is that they ought to protect individuals from having their varied qualities or capacities
inform moral decisions about who to harm, even in conflict situations.

5

Chapter 1: Introduction to The Case for Animal Rights
1.1

Mental Lives Of Animals

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that some non-human animals are similar to
humans in morally relevant ways and have the same basic rights as humans.14 He begins by examining
the reasoning behind what he claims is an already commonly accepted view: that animals have
conscious awareness. To conclude that some animals have a consciousness similar to that of humans, he
first rules out the Cartesian view which denies animal awareness in favor of a mechanistic view of
animal behavior.15 Regan counters Descartes' claim that language is the quality which demonstrates
human consciousness and which separates us from other animals by showing how he believes it is an
inadequate test and pointing out that this would likely imply that some animals, such as great apes have
a mental life.16 As an alternative, Regan believes that evolutionary theory provides us reason to believe
that consciousness evolved due to its adaptive value and thus it is reasonable to believe that it is a shared
characteristic of many species.17 He presents a set of reasons, which together constitute what he calls the
cumulative argument for animal consciousness.18 This argument implies that many species of animals
should be viewed as conscious, particularly all mammalian animals.19 There is no clear answer about
where to draw the line between those animals with consciousness and those without, but Regan explains
that “shadowy borders” should not deter us from attributing it to those animals most like us in the
relevant respects.20 He points out that arbitrariness exists in many of our concepts that we use regularly:
“we cannot say exactly how old or tall someone must be, to be old or tall, respectively, but it does not

14
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follow that we cannot recognize that some people are old or tall.”21 Attributing consciousness to animals
is not anthropomorphic; in fact, Regan claims it would be chauvinistic of humans not to, considering the
reasons presented in the cumulative argument for animal consciousness.22 Based on this argument,
Regan then moves to similarly attributing beliefs and desires to animals. Since his cumulative argument
supports animals having beliefs and desires, the burden of proof is thus on those who wish to argue
otherwise; Regan examines some of these arguments, concluding that they are unsatisfactory.23 Once it
is established that animals have beliefs and desires, he claims that we can further reason that they act
intentionally to satisfy desires, remember and form general concepts on the basis of past experience, and
have a sense of the future including a grasp of their own future: these features taken together imply that
they are self-conscious.24 Regan claims that normal mammals aged one year or more have: perception,
memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness and a sense of future; these qualities, along with emotion and
sentience constitute their complex mental lives.25

1.2 Welfare of Animals

Following the discussion of the mental lives of animals, the issue of welfare is then addressed
and it is concluded that animals have a welfare that does not differ in kind from that of humans.26 Regan
says that animals have “preference autonomy” which is different than notions of autonomy requiring
moral agency (as in the Kantian sense).27 There is a difference between the interests of animals in things
they desire or prefer and things that are in their interests (things that contribute to their welfare).28 The
notion of welfare as described by Regan involves benefits and harms. Benefits make possible or increase

21
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opportunities for the individual to attain a good life, whereas harms negate these possibilities or decrease
opportunities.29 Harms may be in the form of inflictions or deprivations where an infliction is
understood to be physical or mental suffering.30 Pain does not necessarily amount to harm or suffering
and not all harms are painful; harms in the form of deprivations may detract from one's welfare but not
cause pain or suffering – for example, an environment ignoring biological, social or psychological
interests would be considered a harm, regardless of the individual knowing what they were missing.31 A
painless death would also be considered a harm as it results in lost opportunities, whether one desires to
live or not.32 All animals have preference and welfare interests; all may be benefited or harmed, and the
overall quality of an individual's life is a function of the satisfaction of those preferences that it is in the
interests of each to have satisfied.33
Once it is established that animals have a welfare, Regan turns to the task of establishing a moral
theory which incorporates this idea. He attempts to formulate a moral theory that is consistent, simple,
precise, adequate in scope and which conforms to our intuitions.34 He notes that the idea of using
intuitions as grounds for a moral theory is often challenged, but he distinguishes between prereflective
intuitions and reflective intuitions, or “considered beliefs” and claims that reflective intuitions play a
legitimate role in assessing moral principles.35 Of Regan's criteria for accepting moral principles, the one
that has received the most criticism is the one that states that they ought to conform to our intuitions.36
Jan Narveson, for example, argues that Regan's use of intuition is unacceptable: he claims that intuition
is “theoretically bankrupt” and likely to reflect our cultural biases, and thus cannot be a sufficient way to
establish moral principles.37 Regan maintains, however, that reflective intuitions (or considered beliefs)
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
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Ibid, 117.
Ibid.
Ibid, 118.
Ibid, 119.
Ibid, 148.
Ibid., 133-136.
Ibid., xviii.
Ibid, xix-xx.

8

are relevant – he claims that some intuitions may be wrong and need to be discarded, but there must be a
back and forth, a sort of equilibrium, between our intuitions and our thinking about principles and that
we will never be absolutely sure that the moral principles we select are right.38 Our intuitions are only
one factor amongst others in the overall evaluation of moral principles. Regan maintains that if we
consider our intuitions “rationally, coolly, and impartially”, and if we have enough relevant information,
that we can be justified in accepting a moral theory partly because its principles conform to our
intuitions.39 There is no guarantee that the accepted theory is the one true theory, but Regan thinks this is
a task beyond what we are currently capable of and that we must choose the best possible theory, all
things considered.40
Regan favors a theory where certain beings have certain moral rights that do not stem from
utilitarian or other consequentialist reasons; acts are wrong if they violate an individual's moral rights.41
He makes a important distinction between moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are those who
are morally accountable: individuals with sophisticated abilities who are able to act according to moral
principles to determine the proper course of action.42 Moral patients, on the other hand, are those who
should be included in the moral community, but who lack the ability to be morally accountable.43 Moral
agents are usually normal adult humans, while moral patients would include animals, children, or adult
humans who lack the capacities necessary for moral agency. Some moral views involve including only
moral agents as part of the moral community (those who are of direct moral concern). According to
these “indirect duty views”, we have direct duties to moral agents, but merely indirect duties (at best)
towards others who do not qualify as moral agents; but in Regan's view, moral agents and moral patients

38
39
40
41
42
43
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are both of direct moral concern.44 A non-reciprocal relationship exists between them: while moral
agents have duties towards moral patients, moral patients cannot act rightly or wrongly towards moral
agents.45 Regan points out that under indirect duty views, certain human beings, such as children, or the
mentally enfeebled would be excluded from direct moral concern – such views are therefore not
speciesist, but these implications are nevertheless problematic as this seems to be an inadequate way of
describing our duties to some individuals.46 Through examination of some indirect duty views (Jan
Narveson's rational egoism, Rawls' contractarianism and Kantianism), Regan shows how he thinks all of
these demonstrate a moral arbitrariness in excluding moral patients from direct moral concern.47 Using
his criteria for choosing moral principles, Regan establishes a moral principle called “the harm
principle” which states that “we have a direct prima facie duty not to harm individuals”.48 This principle
applies to anyone who is relevantly similar: “any individual who has beliefs and desires, is capable of
acting intentionally, and so forth, and who has an experiential welfare”, so it applies to both moral
agents and moral patients.49 Regan claims that any adequate moral theory must account for our prima
facie duties to both moral agents and patients.50
Regan discusses possible views, aside from the rights view, that could include animals for direct
moral concern. He argues that views that appeal to cruelty and kindness fail because they rely solely on
the motives of moral agents to determine the moral rightness or wrongness of acts.51 If someone were to
harm an animal, not in a sadistic or cruel way, but feeling empathy for them, their actions could not be
morally faulted.52 Regan also criticizes utilitarianism for not having the ability to account for our duties
to moral patients. He argues that it fails to recognize the importance of our direct prima facie duty not to
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
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harm, using the example of secret killings to show that (at least an act-utilitarian) would not have a basis
to condemn murders in some situations.53 Though utilitarianism is often thought to be egalitarian, it is
utility alone that is basic for utilitarians, and Regan explains that equal consideration for individuals
within utilitarianism is only a predistributive requirement; when it comes to distributive concerns, it is
consistent with treating individuals unequally when it comes to deciding how to bring about the best
aggregate consequences.54 Regan is also critical of perfectionist theories of justice, claiming they are
“morally pernicious, providing, as they do, the foundation of the most objectionable forms of social,
political, and legal discrimination – chattel slavery, rigid caste systems, and gross disparities in the
quality of life available to citizens in the same state, for example”.55 He claims that, more importantly,
perfectionist theories are objectionable due to the fact that natural talents of individuals are beyond their
control, and it is thus unfair to deny benefits essential to the welfare of those lacking these gifts.56 Regan
believes the correct interpretation of justice must be nonutilitarian, nonperfectionist, and egalitarian.57

1.3.1 Inherent Value

For Regan, justice involves the idea of the equality of individuals with “inherent value”, or value
in themselves.58 Inherent value is a distinct type of value from the intrinsic value of an individual's
experiences; the cumulative value of their experiences, pleasures or preference satisfactions does not
give rise to inherent value and inherent value is not reducible to these sorts of values.59 To have inherent
value is to have a type of value that is more than merely being capable of experiencing intrinsically
valuable things. Those with inherent value have “something different from, and something more than,

53
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mere receptacles of what has intrinsic value. They have value in their own right, a value that is distinct
from, not reducible to, and incommensurate with the values of these experiences which, as receptacles,
they have or undergo.”60 Utilitarianism treats individuals as receptacles of what has value (i.e.
happiness) instead of directly treating individuals as having value. According to Regan, inherent value is
a categorical concept, and so individuals must be viewed as having inherent value equally – those with
happier lives, or more cultivated preferences do have greater inherent value.61 If it came in degrees,
there would have to be a basis for determining that degree and this would either be unfairly
discriminatory or would result in an unacceptable interpretation of justice whereby some individuals
could be justly required to serve the needs of others.62 Viewing individuals as having equal inherent
value is egalitarian and nonperfectionist, and this type of egalitarianism is better than that of
utilitarianism because the postulate of inherent value forces us to look at the value of an individual
directly to determine what is just or unjust, and not simply at some value they contain as receptacles.63
This way of thinking does not allow for some of the possible negative implications of utilitarianism,
such as secret killings.64 Both moral agents and moral patients have inherent value because it would be
arbitrary to regard moral agents as having inherent value while denying it to moral patients.65
The relevant similarity that Regan believes unites moral agents and patients (including animals)
as having inherent value is that they are all subjects-of-a-life.66 Subjects-of-a-life are individuals who
have “beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare- interests; the ability
to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an
individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independent
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
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of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's
interests.”67 Those who satisfy this criterion are more than mere receptacles and have inherent value.
Since inherent value is a categorical concept, any relevant similarity for determining who has inherent
value must be categorical itself, and so all subjects-of-a-life are so equally.68 Since Regan has shown
that normal mammals one year or older have a complex mental life which fits this description, they
qualify as being subjects-of-a-life.
Those with inherent value must, as a matter of justice, receive equal respect from moral agents.69
Treating individuals with inherent value as mere receptacles by harming them to bring about the best
aggregate consequences is unjust, because by doing so, we fail to respect their inherent value.70 Regan
introduces the “respect principle” which states that we should “always treat those with inherent value in
ways that respect their inherent value.”71 The respect principle entails a duty to come to the aid of
victims of injustice, not merely a prohibition on harming others ourselves.72 This respect principle is
more fundamental than the harm principle; the harm principle may be derived from the respect
principle.73 Based on these principles, we have a prima facie duty not to harm individuals with inherent
value.74 In order to be morally permitted to cause any harm to either a moral agent or a moral patient,
one would need just reasons for overriding this prima facie duty. Our duty to respect individuals with
inherent value is how Regan begins to establish moral rights for animals – all subjects-of-a-life have
basic moral rights which are held equally.

67
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1.3.2 Inherent Value Criticism
Regan notes that many of his critics have focused on his notion of inherent value. It is an
important concept for his theory, since it provides the basic justification for rights. He acknowledges
that individual subjects-of-a-life may have very unequal intrinsic value, but maintains that this does not
affect the equality of their inherent value. Edwards agrees with Regan that individual centers of
conscious experience are valuable in and of themselves and that their value is not reducible to the sum of
the value of their experiences, but he rejects the idea that animals are equally subjects-of-a-life with
equal inherent worth.75 He thinks there are degrees of being a subject-of-a-life because individuals can
differ in their complexity of organization, the degree to which they can exemplify the defining
characteristics, as well as the richness of traits outside the list of criteria given by Regan (moral agency
for example).76 He notes that all of the defining characteristics are abilities or capacities (beliefs, desires,
perceptions, memories, sense of future, emotions, ability to feel pleasure and pain, a welfare etc), and
thus are exhibited to varying degrees by both humans and animals; because of this, Edwards argues that
Regan does in fact favor preferred abilities and so does not avoid perfectionism.77 I think that Edwards is
mistaken in claiming that Regan is committed to perfectionism in this respect. Even if it is true that
individuals exhibit all of these characteristics to varying degrees, it may be that possession of these
capacities is the relevant factor, not the degree to which individuals have them. Possession of certain
characteristics can form a basis for a moral reason, even if they are not possessed equally by all.
Distinguishing between the value of individuals with varying capacities for emotion or memory etc., is
quite different than claiming that they have inherent value due to their possession of these
characteristics. By Edwards' perfectionistic reasoning, we would be committed to saying that certain
humans are more or less subjects-of-a-life as well, due to the varying degrees to which they can

75
76
77
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exemplify the characteristics. This would be an unacceptable view for anyone who believes that humans
share certain fundamental equal rights.
Mary Anne Warren claims that inherent value is a key concept in Regan's theory, yet it is
obscure, presented as a “mysterious non-natural property which we must take on faith”.78 She asks how
it can be a postulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent value: “if the inherent value of a being is
completely independent of the value that it or anyone else places upon its experiences, then why does
the fact that it has certain sorts of experiences constitute evidence that it has inherent value?”79 She
points out that inherent value is defined mostly in negative terms, about what it is not, but that we are
not given a clear description of what it is itself.80 Similarly, Edwards claims that “Regan fails to make a
clear conceptual or definitional distinction between intrinsic and inherent values”.81 He notes that
inherent and intrinsic values are defined by Regan in similar ways; the distinction is not clearly made
formally or conceptually, but rather through examples.82 He claims that instead of having the distinction
between intrinsic and inherent value, it would work equivalently to have “a pluralistic theory of intrinsic
good which affirms that more than one kind of thing – e.g. pleasures and individuals – are valuable in
and of themselves.”83 So when Regan claims that the inherent value of individuals is incommensurate
with, and not reducible to the intrinsic values of their experiences, Edwards believes that “this could be
just as well expressed by saying that individual subjects-of-a-life and their pleasant experiences both
have intrinsic value and that the value of the former is incommensurate with and not reducible to the
value of the latter.”84 Warren argues that if inherent value is based on some property, that we should try
to identify that property and explain why it is morally significant without the intermediate step of
inherent value; and if, on the other hand, it is not based on a natural quality, then it seems to be lacking
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support for us to believe in it.85 She argues that it cannot therefore reliably play such a crucial role in
Regan's theory. Regan uses inherent value to move to attributing rights to subjects-of-a-life, but Warren
argues that since there is not a positive account of what inherent value is, that this connection is not
strong. She states that she sees no inconsistency in saying that some things have inherent value, yet do
not have moral rights (a tree, river, or a collection of things such as a species for example).86

1.3.3 Ultimate Value
Regan describes inherent value as a postulate meant to avoid some of the negative outcomes of a
utilitarian theory, so it is meant to capture the idea that individuals have value aside from any sort of
value they contain; they are seen as being valuable in themselves and not as mere receptacles of value.87
However, it seems that he is not just saying that they have some value in themselves, but a special,
strong type of value. The confusion may be due in part to the fact that the terms inherent and intrinsic
are commonly used interchangeably, but Regan's use of the word inherent seems to imply something
more than the mere distinction between something having value as a receptacle itself versus being a
valuable experience. The inherent value of the receptacle (or individual) is distinguished as being a
completely different type of value than that of the value of its experiences: “like proverbial apples and
oranges the two kinds of value do not fall within the same scale of comparison.”88 Normally, we would
accept that some things have intrinsic value, but that they do not hold rights; and if inherent and intrinsic
are used interchangeably, Warren's criticism would be problematic. But if Regan's conception of
inherent value implies something different – something stronger than the usual sense of the word, it
could avoid this problem and explain why it is associated with rights.
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Regan explains that his theory is broadly Kantian in tradition, in the sense that some individuals
ought to never be treated as mere means, or as receptacles of value.89 He states that the idea of inherent
value is “after the fashion of Kant's idea of individuals existing as ends-in-themselves.”90 It differs from
Kant's views in terms of which individuals merit this consideration since Kant held that only moral
agents, or rational beings, are ends-in-themselves, while Regan argues that all subjects-of-a-life are.91
For Kant, humans have intrinsic value due to their capacity for reason and since animals according to
Kant lack rationality, they are only 'things' with relative value and any duties we have towards them are
indirect ones.92 Kant claimed that ends-in-themselves have dignity, while relative things have only
price.93 Thomas Hill explains that Kant talked of dignity as an 'intrinsic value', an unconditioned worth,
not dependent upon contingent facts – so anything with dignity has value independent of benefits it
might produce or whether it is valued by anyone else.94 Dignity is considered to have incomparable
worth and is beyond all price.95 This means that “whenever one must choose between something with
dignity and something with mere price one should always choose the former. No amount of price, or
value dependent on contingent needs and tastes, can justify or compensate for sacrifice of dignity.”96 I
think that Regan's account of inherent value is intended to represent something more like the Kantian
sense of dignity, rather than something simply having some value in itself. Something with Regan's
sense of inherent value may never be traded off in order to maximize good consequences. This is
something more than what is commonly intended when we use the term inherent value.
Raz makes a useful distinction in his account of the nature of rights. He claims that only
individuals whose well-being is of “ultimate value” have rights.97 Being of ultimate value means having
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intrinsic value that does not derive from contributing to the value of something else – in other words, its
value is non-derivative.98 Something may be intrinsically valuable but not of ultimate value if it noninstrumentally contributes to the well-being of something which is of ultimate value (for example, works
of art, or plants have intrinsic, but not ultimate value).99 This distinction between two types of noninstrumental value (intrinsic value and ultimate value) is similar to what I think Regan is aiming to
achieve by separating intrinsic value from inherent value. Raz's terminology makes the distinction
clearer however, since 'ultimate' indicates something different from, and more than, 'intrinsic'.
Carl Cohen also thinks that there are two types of non-instrumental value (two senses of inherent
value), and accuses Regan of equivocation by arguing that Regan bases his rights theory on animals
having the stronger sense of inherent value when they should only be attributed the lesser sense.100
According to Cohen, Regan's account of inherent value describes a view that is essentially like Kant's
view of humanity, where humans are equal in value in a deep sense, have a dignity and are beyond all
price.101 Cohen claims that this sense of the concept of inherent value is a plausible approach to
describing the moral condition of human beings, but applies only to moral agents, and thus not to
animals.102 Animals, he claims, have inherent value in the sense that wild animals, trees, or any unique
living creature do, and this is why we may not wantonly slaughter animals or hunt them for amusement
etc.103 He argues that Regan has shifted the two meanings to describe animals as having inherent value
in the Kantian sense, when only moral agents have this type of inherent value.104 He believes the
confusion arises because the two uses of the term are both common and intelligible, and also since
humans have inherent value in both the weaker and the stronger sense.105 I disagree with Cohen that
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Regan has committed a fallacy of equivocation, since an important part of Regan's argument is showing
why he thinks moral agency is not a relevant in terms of who merits moral consideration, and he does
attempt to build a case for what seems like the stronger sense of the concept of inherent value existing in
animals. Cohen does make a useful point about the confusion in terminology though. There is the sense
of inherent value that Regan intended, and another sense of the term that is commonly used. For this
reason, I think that making a clear distinction between the two types of non-instrumental value and
perhaps using a different term, such as Raz's 'ultimate' value would clarify things. In further discussions
of inherent value, I will take it to mean something like more like 'ultimate value'. It is not entirely clear
whether Regan meant for inherent value to mean something more like ultimate value, but thinking about
the concept in this way may be necessary to make this part of his theory intelligible, and could help
address some of the criticisms related to the inherent value concept.
Warren's criticism that there seem to be things that could have inherent value, yet lack rights,
could be resolved if the well-being of animals is considered to be of ultimate value, whereas the value of
a tree for example (which may have intrinsic value) is not of ultimate value. It may be the case that we
have special moral duties towards things with intrinsic value, but that they do not have rights in the way
that ultimately valuable (subjects-of-a-life) do.
According to Regan, being a subject-of-a-life is not a necessary condition for having inherent
value; it is meant to be a sufficient condition to make the attribution of inherent value intelligible and
nonarbitrary.106 He claims that there could be individuals or collections of individuals that have inherent
value despite not fitting the subject-of-a-life criterion; though he believes it would be difficult to make
such a case.107 For example, he discusses the possibility of an ethic of the environment in which natural
objects, or collections of such objects have inherent value; he claims that it would be difficult to work
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out such a view, but that his theory does not exclude the possibility.108 In particular, he notes the
difficulty of reconciling the individualistic nature of rights with the holistic view of the environment.
This problem might be avoided with the distinction between intrinsic value and ultimate value though.
Ecosystems, trees, insects etc. all have intrinsic value but not the inherent/ultimate value that is
associated generally with subjects-of-a-life and is the grounds for individualistic rights.

1.3.4 Line-Drawing Criticism
The issue of where to draw a line separating those who are subjects-of-a-life and those who are
not has been pointed out by some critics. Where the cutoff point is in terms of species and also in terms
of the development of individuals is unclear. For example, babies are excluded until they are one year
old, as well as any non-mammalian animals.
There are a few possible responses to this problem:
1. There may be some things with basic rights that are not subjects-of-a-life. Regan reminds us that
being a subject-of-a-life is merely a sufficient condition for having inherent value and basic rights, and
that it is possible that some of those who do not meet the criteria nevertheless have rights.109
2. It is best to err on the side of caution and treat unclear cases as if they do have rights. Regan explains
that we may have reason to treat some individuals who are not clear cases of subjects-of-a-life as if they
have rights. For example, infants may not clearly qualify as rights bearers but we may decide that it is
best if we give them the benefit of the doubt and treat them as if they are.110
3. We have other moral obligations aside from rights. There may be considerations aside from rights that
would give us reason to consider them morally and have duties towards them. Something not having
rights does not imply that we may do anything we would like to them.111
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Regan admits that he does not have a clear answer at this point about where to draw lines in all
cases, but he does not consider this incompleteness to be a major problem since it does not affect the
adequacy of the subject-of-a-life criterion as a sufficient condition for inherent value.112 We can still be
confident that at least the individuals he has stated (normal, mammalian animals, aged one or more)
have inherent value.113 He considers his policy of including normal adult mammals of one year or more
to be a conservative one, meaning his intention was to include fewer than he really thinks should be to
minimize disputes about this part of his view.114 He has purposefully included only “individuals well
beyond the point where anyone could reasonably 'draw the line' separating those who have the mental
abilities in question from those who lack them.”115 Since he thinks we should err on the side of caution,
Regan thinks that there are reasons to view some who do not clearly meet the requirements for being a
subject-of-a-life as if they have rights (infants, viable fetuses, and animals lower on the phylogenetic
scale, such as birds and fish).116 By giving some who do not meet the criteria for being a subject-of-alife the benefit of the doubt, we would view them “as if they are subjects-of-a-life, as if they have basic
moral rights, even while conceding that, in viewing them in these ways, we may be giving them more
than is their due”.117
Mary Anne Warren discusses some problems that may arise when we try to extend rights to
animals outside of the ones Regan has confidently stipulated. She points out that since inherent value is
a categorical concept, all those with it have it equally, and have equal moral rights while those not
included have no moral rights – she believes that any such sharp division is implausible, yet it is
required by the way Regan has set things up.118 Warren discusses a number of unclear cases about who
should count as subjects-of-a-life, pointing out that this criterion does not give us adequate information
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about how to deal morally with the vast majority of animals.119 She believes that this would not be a
problem if his theory was not set up in a dualistic fashion, pointing out that as his theory is now, we
must “say that either a spider has the same right to life as you and I do, or it has no right to life
whatever” and we do not have a way to clearly determine this.120 She thinks that it would be more likely
that “subjecthood” comes in degrees, with more sophisticated creatures having a higher degree of it.121 It
is true that inherent value and being a subject-of-a-life are set up as categorical concepts in Regan's
theory; however, simply because we lack the ability to determine an exact cut-off point, it does not mean
that we must abandon the idea. As Regan points out, many of our commonly used concepts do not have
clear cut-off points, but it does not prevent us from understanding that the concept exists in clear
cases.122 And since Regan has not claimed that rights exhaustively describe our moral duties, it is
possible that we may have other, non-rights-based moral obligations towards things that are not
subjects-of-a-life. For example, if spiders lack inherent value, it does not automatically give us
permission to do treat them in any way we want; we may still have moral duties towards them. The
distinction between ultimate and intrinsic value is useful here. Raz claims that only those whose wellbeing is of ultimate value may have rights, but that we may have duties to protect or promote the wellbeing of intrinsically valuable things.123 So in the case of insects, we might say that they do not have a
right to life, but that we have reasons to consider them morally and perhaps make efforts to spare their
lives; they would just be lacking the same strong protection that would be accorded by a right to life.
Warren points out that Regan's policy of erring on the side of caution is problematic because if
we gave the benefit of the doubt to all questionable creatures, she argues that we would have
unfulfillable moral obligations.124 This is an important concern and it relates to another problem: it
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would make situations where rights conflict more complicated. If we must choose to override the rights
of those who are merely questionable subjects-of-a-life and those who certainly are, it is not clear if
those we are unsure about should be given the full consideration of having rights status, or whether these
rights would be held less stringently, and the first to be scarified. If we are aware of the fact that we are
attributing to some individuals something that is possibly more than they are due, it may be argued that
we have reason to not always treat them as if they have rights. If we mistakenly treat borderline cases as
having lesser rights than clear ones, this would be unfair if they are in fact subjects-of-a-life; but on the
other hand, if we grant them rights erroneously, in trying to uphold these rights, we could end up
harming definite subjects-of-a-life by doing so. It seems likely though, that if we were to determine a
more accurate cut-off point, it would not be too far off from the one Regan has given, and this may not
end up entailing unfulfillable moral obligations. Also, if we decide to adopt policies of erring on the side
of caution, and granting rights to questionable subjects-of-a-life, I think that this would have to be
limited to cases where we are able to without being overcommitted and in instances where the rights are
not in conflict with others.
If we accept Regan's response that we may never have an exact answer as to where to draw a
line, and accept his cautious boundary, it is still problematic for his animal rights theory since it happens
to exclude a large proportion of the animals we use in practices that Regan would like abolished. Many
of the animals used in research and food production are less than one year old, and fish and birds
constitute a large percentage of animals killed for food, but they are not mammals and so do not fit
Regan's criterion. His strategy of being deliberately cautious may make it easier to accept a first step of
attributing rights to some animals, but even fully accepting Regan's theory as it is presented, including
his cut-off point, would not entail an obligation to abolish these practices. We would only have to stop
using mammals aged one year or more. His boundary also excludes human infants, and this seems
contrary to our considered beliefs about who has rights. Even if we give them the benefit of the doubt,
23

and treat them in a way such that we may be giving them more than they are due, as Regan suggests, this
seems like an inadequate way of describing the rights of babies less than one year old (it seems
counterintuitive to think that a baby would only develop a true right to life at the age of one). If we are
quite confident that an adequate description of who has rights must include babies, this could be a good
starting point for trying to determine a more accurate cut-off point for who ought to count as a subjectof-a-life. Regan deliberately set it up to exclude some he thinks should be included, but I think that it
would help his position to give a more accurate description of where the cut-off point is.
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Chapter 2: Basic Rights and Duties
2.1 Rights Background
How we conceive of rights will determine the frequency of conflicts and impact the way they are
resolved. Even in discussions of human rights, there is ongoing debate about the concept and function of
rights, which rights we have, and how to handle conflicts of rights. The addition of animals as rights
bearers complicates these issues. Raz notes that the philosophical definition of a right differs from the
ordinary meaning, and that those discussing rights in law, politics or morality are usually using the term
in a more restrictive sense, referring to a sub-class of the types of cases where the term can properly be
applied linguistically.125 He notes some dangers of having an inaccurate definition of rights – for
example, a definition of rights in which rights are not important is problematic, but also, we do not want
to end up overextending our use of the term right and end up calling anything of value a right.126 It is
thus worthwhile to examine what we mean when we talk of moral rights, as this will impact how
conflicts of rights are resolved.
A widely adopted system for describing rights is that of Hohfeld, a legal scholar who tried to
clarify the concept of a right.127 There are eight Hohfeldian relations: claims, duties, liberties, no-claims,
powers, liabilities, immunities and disabilities. Rule systems (sets of rules that govern action) create
Hohfeldian relations.128 A legal system is an example of a rule system, but others could be rule systems
of sports, companies, social organizations etc. In a legal system individuals could have a legal claim,
legal duty, legal liberty etc. A moral rule system would imply Hohfeldian relations in a similar way:
individuals would have moral claims, moral duties, moral liberties, etc.129 Hohfeldian relations always
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have exactly two agents and a content (the action with respect to which one has a claim, duty etc.).130 An
important point to note is that duty in Hohfeldian terms is different than the usual sense – we sometimes
speak of having duties where there is no object (such as a duty to be charitable, without specifying a
recipient), but duties must always have an object in Hohfeldian terms.131 Claims and duties in
Hohfeldian terms are correlative. If person 1 has a duty towards person 2, person 2 equivalently has a
claim against person 1.132 Hohfeld held that rights were claims, but many have rejected this definition as
being too restrictive and have argued that we have some rights that correspond to other types of
Hohfeldian relations.133 Now it is commonly thought that there are four basic types of 'Hohfeldian
incidents' that fit together to to create different types of rights.134 The four Hohfeldian incidents are:
1. Priveleges/Liberties: “A has a privilege to φ if and only if A has no duty not to φ.”
2. Claims: “A has a claim that B φ if and only if B has a duty to A to φ.”
3. Powers: “A has a power if and only if A has the ability within a set of rules to alter her own or
another's Hohfeldian incidents.”
4. Immunities: “B has an immunity if and only if A lacks the ability within a set of rules to alter
B's Hohfeldian incidents.”135
Each of these incidents may be a right when it occurs in isolation (the four corresponding types of rights
would be claim rights, immunity rights, liberty rights and power rights), or they may fit together to
produce more complex rights.136 In the next section, I will explain Regan's analysis of basic rights as
valid claims. His theory of animal rights is concerned with claim rights – the basic moral rights of
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subjects-of-a-life, so he does not address liberty rights, power rights etc., though their possibility is not
excluded.
Traditional answers to the question of what the function of a right is can be broadly grouped into
two categories: interest theories and will theories.137 The Hohfeldian analysis of the form of rights is
neutral in regard to which of these theories is correct. In will theories of rights, rights function as a way
of according control to rights-holders over others' duties; an individual has a right when others have
duties to protect a choice of that individual.138 Will theories of rights hold the following principles:
1. Sufficient and necessary for X’s holding of a right is that X is competent and authorized
to demand or waive the enforcement of the right.
2. X’s holding of a right does not necessarily involve the protection of one or more of X’s
interests.
3. A right’s potential to protect one or more of X’s interests is not sufficient per se for X’s
actual possession of that right.139
This type of theory clearly has the limitation that anyone unable to make choices is excluded. Comatose
individuals, infants, and animals would all be excluded as possible rights holders. Interest theories of
rights allow for the possibility of these individuals having rights.
Interest theories are those that ground rights in the interests of rights-holders that make them
better off; an individual has a right when others have duties to protect an interest of that individual.140
Interest theories of rights hold the following two principles:
1. Necessary but insufficient for the actual holding of a right by a person X is that the right, when
actual, preserves one or more of X’s interests.
2. X’s being competent and authorized to demand or waive the enforcement of a right is neither
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sufficient nor necessary for X to be endowed with that right.141
One drawback of the interest theory is that it seems sometimes we may have a right to things that are not
in our interest, such as acquiring property that is more of a burden than it is worth.142 George Rainbolt is
not satisfied with either the interest or the will theory of rights and offers an alternative view he calls the
“justified constraint theory of rights” in which a person has a right “if and only if a feature of that person
is a reason for others to have a particular sort of normative constraint.”143 He explains that rights
necessarily constrain the action of others and that the only Hoheldian relations which impose a
normative constraint on others are claims and immunities, and so rights, according to Rainbolt, must be
claims or immunities.144
Raz's account of the nature of rights is one of the most commonly cited interest theories of rights.
His definition of rights is: “'x has a right' if and only if x can have rights, and other things being equal,
an aspect of x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be
under a duty.”145 This definition is meant to capture the core that is common to all different types of
rights (including liberty rights, for example), not only the basic rights covered by Regan. Raz
distinguishes between core and derivative rights (those which derive from core rights).146
According to Raz, the practical role of rights is to ground duties in people based on the
interests of the rights-holders.147 Rights are grounds of duties and sometimes of other rights.148 Every
right is grounds for at least one duty, and often more than one. Different circumstances may lead to new
duties for the same right, and Raz believes that this dynamic aspect of rights is the key to understanding
their relation to duties.149 Because of this, we can never exhaustively describe a right in terms of its
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correlative duties. He notes there may also be duties not associated with rights. Interests are part of the
justification of rights, which are part of the justification of the corresponding duties; rights therefore
function as intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties.150 These intermediate
conclusions are practical because they enable us to not have to refer back to ultimate values each time
we discuss duties.
Raz claims that a right “is the ground of a duty, a ground which, if not counteracted by
conflicting considerations, justifies holding that person to have the duty.”151 According to Raz, people
have duties which stem from rights, but “only to the extent that there are no conflicting considerations of
greater weight.”152 General rights are only a prima facie ground for a right in circumstances where it
applies. Regan also characterizes rights as prima facie ones – we may sometimes override rights in light
of conflicting considerations.

2.2 Basic Rights as Valid Claims
Regan uses his conclusions about the mental lives of animals and his principles of justice to
explain how animals have some basic moral rights. He explains that basic moral rights differ from legal
rights in that they are held universally and equally by all relevantly similar individuals in possession of a
given right; they differ from acquired rights because they do not arise as a result of someone's voluntary
actions or as a result of an institutional arrangement.153 Regan describes moral rights as valid claims that
have correlative moral duties for moral agents.154 Having a moral right entails that we are in a position
to claim some treatment owed to us from someone, or have it claimed on our behalf.155 Making claims
involves making a claim-to a certain treatment one is entitled to as well as a claim-against any number
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of individuals.156 In order to have valid claim all considered, one must have a valid claim-to and a valid
claim-against.157 Regan claims that valid assertions about what treatment we are due “depends in part on
whether it is within the powers and capacities of those against whom the claim is made to do or forbear
doing what is claimed as due”.158 To have a valid claim-against, we must show that “the treatment
claimed as due is owed by those individuals against whom the claim is made.”159 A valid claim all
considered (and thus a moral right) occurs when we have valid claims to and against, as well as appeals
to appropriate valid moral principles.160 Though animals (and other moral patients) may lack the ability
to make valid claims for themselves, they may nevertheless have them.161 Regan argues that “no account
of moral rights can be adequate that makes the existence of basic moral rights contingent upon the
performance of this or that voluntary act.”162 Having a valid claim, for Regan, means one has a certain
moral status and “whether one has this status depends not on whether one can claim one's rights but on
whether one has them, and this depends on whether sound arguments can be given for the recognition of
these rights independently of the ability on the part of the individual who possesses them to claim
them”.163
Moral rights of individuals give rise to different types of duties for moral agents: acquired duties
and unacquired duties. An acquired duty would be one we have due to voluntary acts such as honoring a
contract, whereas unacquired duties exist regardless of our voluntary acts (an example would be our
duty to treat others justly).164 Those who are part of unjust voluntary agreements acquire no duties;
acquired duties play a legitimate role if and only if they are valid duties which are just, as dictated by the
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respect principle.165 Promises to others would be an example of an acquired duty, and those to whom
you have made a promise would have a correlative acquired right. This is different than moral views
where agreements are made by self-interested individuals, because “the moral validity of the agreements
or contracts reached must be shown by appeal to a principle that is not itself a product of the contract or
agreement” and this is how the rights view avoids excluding moral patients.166 While rights may involve
both types of duties, Regan focuses his analysis on unacquired duties and their correlative rights. The
duty of justice, for example, is unacquired, so the correlative right to just treatment must be viewed as an
unacquired right.167 Regan terms such unacquired rights “basic rights” since these rights, as well as their
correlative duties exist irrespective of any voluntary acts one performs or of any institutional
arrangements one may be a part of.168
Regan claims, given the analysis of rights as valid claims, that those who have inherent value
have the basic right to the respectful treatment that his respect principle requires of moral agents.169 He
argues that justice is something one can rightly claim as one's due, unlike charity, and since the respect
principle, as a matter of justice, states that those with inherent value ought to be treated in ways that
respect that value, we can also say that they have a basic right so such treatment.170 Since both moral
agents and moral patients have equal inherent value, the claim to respectful treatment, and also the right
to such treatment, is equal for both.171 When we treat animals respectfully, it is not an act of kindness,
but rather an act of justice.172 The rights of individuals do not depend on the utility of recognizing these
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rights; they have these rights independently of the consequences that result from recognizing them.173
According to Regan's rights view, basic moral rights are independent of, and more basic than utility.174
Regan claims that establishing rights for individuals does not necessarily give us adequate
information to determine our moral obligations in any given situation – rights merely establish the moral
relevance of rights bearers in determining the morally right course of action.175 The morally correct
action cannot be determined without considering the rights of those involved, but we cannot simply
determine what ought to be done by citing rights possessed by individuals.176 We may have duties that
are not associated with a right. For example, he argues that we have a duty to be charitable, but that no
one has a valid claim, or right, to the charity of others. Since there are many ways to accomplish the
duty to be charitable, specific charities do not have a correlative right to our charitable contributions;
they do not have a valid claim-against us with regard to charitable donations.177

2.3.1 Duties of Assistance
Though no one has a right to charitable treatment, this does not imply that in respecting the rights
of others, all of our duties will be negative ones; some non-charitable duties associated with basic rights
involve coming to the aid of an individual who is having their rights violated. Not only do we have a
duty to respect the rights of individuals, basic rights imply that we have duties of justice to assist those
who are having their rights violated: we have a prima facie duty of assistance.178 We have a duty to aid
individuals, including animals, that are victims of injustice (having their rights violated). According to
Regan, it is only possible to have a valid claim against moral agents; for this reason, though we may be
harmed by nature or by moral patients, they have no duties, and it is thus nonsensical to speak of them
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violating our rights.179 Regan claims that while we do have a prima facie duty to assist those whose
rights are being violated, we do not have the same duty to assist those who are being harmed by moral
patients or by nature, and thus, we do not have a duty to assist animals from attacks by other animals.180
I am assuming that what Regan means by 'nature' is anything other than a moral agent; he claims that in
order to have a right violated, one needs to be able to make a valid claim against someone.181 Only
moral agents have duties, since only they have the necessary cognitive and other abilities necessary for
being held morally accountable.182 Therefore, we may only have validated claims against moral agents,
and only they may violate our rights.

2.3.2 Duties of Assistance Criticism
Dale Jamieson criticizes Regan's account of our duties of assistance as being incomplete.183 He
claims that Regan does not make it a requirement that we help those in need who have not been victims
of injustice, for example, someone in a perilous situation that arose out of natural causes.184 This is how
Jamieson says Regan avoids the problem of us being required to save animals from predators (which is
often cited as an absurd consequence of accepting the idea that animals have rights).185 Regan's policy
on wild animals is that we ought to “let them be”, respecting them to use their natural abilities and live
their own lives.186 Jamieson thinks that this is incompatible with having duties to rescue subjects-of-alife from harms caused in nature. According to Jamieson, Regan's account of duties would lead to us
being required to assist others where there is a great risk to us (to fulfill a duty of justice), and yet not at
times where there is very little risk (but where no one's rights had been violated).187 Regan agrees with
Jamieson that a complete moral theory must address what duties of assistance we have, and he states that
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in cases where no one's rights have been violated, even if we do not owe them anything as a matter of
justice, we could still have a prima facie duty of beneficence, and that the rights view is compatible with
this type of duty.188 One important stipulation Regan places on duties of beneficence is that they cannot
promote good at the expense of violating the rights of others; duties of associated with justice (or basic
rights) always take precedence over duties of beneficence.189 Jamieson does not find this idea
satisfactory though. He presents various scenarios involving a boulder rolling towards a man and
someone being in a position to warn the man and save his life: in some, the boulder is falling due to
natural causes, in others because of a deliberate attempt to kill the man.190 In considering the possibility
that we are required to warn the man in each case, but because of different types of duties, Jamieson
finds this implausible. It seems counterintuitive to claim that we have a duty to warn the man in both
cases, but that the man only has a right to be warned when the boulder was deliberately pushed towards
him. Jamieson thinks that if Regan were to adopt the strategy of claiming that we have duties to warn the
man for different reasons, he would again face the problem of us having a duty to assist prey animals,
for reasons other than justice.191 Jamieson claims that since death for prey animals often involves
unnecessary suffering, even if it were argued that carnivorous animals need to kill to survive, we might
end up still having a duty to prevent the carnivorous animals from killing, and then humanely slaughter
some animals ourselves to feed them when necessary.192 This, he believes, is a problem not just for
Regan, but for anyone who thinks that preventing unnecessary suffering or death is a requirement
(utilitarians such as Singer, for example).193 If Regan were to stop our duties at those of justice, it would
avoid this problem, but result in an incomplete, unacceptable account of our moral duties.194
Jamieson is also critical of the idea that duties of justice must always take priority over
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duties of beneficence and he offers another example to illustrate how this could result in some
inconsistent outcomes. If the boulder was set in motion naturally, a competing duty could relieve
someone of their duty to warn the man, whereas if it had been pushed, it could not, and it seems that our
duty to warn the victim should remain equally stringent, regardless of how the boulder came to be
rolling towards him.195 Jamieson's boulder examples show instances where duties appear to be equally
stringent, but we could further imagine instances where duties to aid someone in a natural predicament
could be even more stringent than what Regan has characterized as duties of justice. For example, we
may have to choose between aiding someone being mildly harmed by having their rights violated, or
someone else in much more urgent need who is there by natural causes in which their rights had not
been violated. In these types of scenarios it seems that our duties to rescue the individual in urgent need
should outweigh our duties to aid someone being mildly harmed by having their rights violated.
Furthermore, even if we had to actually violate someone's rights by mildly harming them in order to
save the person in urgent need, this may still be the morally right action. I think that for this part of
Regan's theory to remain plausible, we would have to find some way to characterize failing to warn the
man as a violation of his rights. Jamieson considers this possibility, that failing to warn the victim is not
merely failing to assist him, but actually constitutes harming him, thus resulting in injustice and
explaining why we have a strict duty to warn him equally in all cases. He thinks that this conception of
causation would threaten Regan's antiutilitarian approach though: “once we have accepted the view that
failure to prevent harm sometimes constitutes injustice, it may be difficult to resist a thorough-going
consequentialist conception of justice”.196 I do not think that this is necessarily the case though. Thomas
Nagel explains that in situations where we foresee that our actions will cause or fail to prevent a harm
that one does not intend to bring about, it does not come under a deontological constraint, though it may
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be objectionable nevertheless.197 But deontological constraints do apply to intentionally permitting as
well as intentionally doing harm.198 So in the boulder example, failing to warn the man intentionally
would violate a deontological constraint, though failing to warn him because you were preoccupied with
something else for example, would not. This distinction of intentionally permitting something versus
unintentionally failing to prevent something makes a moral difference, and does not force us back to a
consequentialist conception of justice.
Characterizing intentionally permitting harm as a rights violation leads back to the problem of
predation in wild animals. It may be the case that if animals do have rights that we do in fact have a duty
to rescue prey animals when we are present and able to stop it. This may seem like an absurd
consequence of the rights view, but it may be one we have to accept. Wild animals present a unique
problem though, and there may be relevant differences between scenarios involving human beings
versus those that arise with animals in the wild. Many carnivorous animals need to kill to survive and to
feed their young. If we were to stop them from harming prey animals, we would stop ourselves from
intentionally permitting the deaths of the prey animals, while at the same time possibly intentionally
permitting the deaths of the predators. This might best be framed as an apparent dilemma, and as I will
argue later, in apparent dilemmas, either option would be permissible. Also, moral agents are not usually
present for conflicts that occur between wild animals, and the rights view does not make it obligatory
that we go out of our way to prevent all rights conflicts.

2.4 Implications of the Animal Rights View
Animal rights views focus on the protection of animals as individuals. Adopting a view of animal
rights would clearly result in drastic changes from our current practices involving animals. According to
Regan, his rights view implies that vegetarianism is obligatory since animal agriculture fails to respect
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the inherent value of farm animals.199 He believes that his rights view, unlike utilitarianism, has reason
to prohibit all animal agriculture, even “humanely” farmed and killed animals since, according to the
rights view, individual moral agents have a duty to withhold support from animal agricultural
businesses, regardless of the impact doing so would have on the market for meat.200 Regan argues that
only in exceptional circumstances may we violate the rights of an animal in order to get food (i.e. in life
threatening situations).201 Hunting and trapping are also wrong according to Regan's view.202 Wild
animals should not be treated as a “renewable resource” as this implies that they have value only relative
to human interests.203 Regan claims that the rights view's position is to let wildlife be.204 Animal rights
views are distinct from many environmental views, in that in terms of animals, the latter tends to be
more concerned with species or ecosystem preservation as a whole, and may allow for killing of some
individual animals in order to reach that goal. The rights view is concerned with animals as individuals
and does not acknowledge a privileged moral status for members of endangered species; it is compatible
with efforts to save these animals, but this is because they are individual animals with value, not because
they belong to an endangered species.205 Regan explains that despite this distinction, it is possible for
some of the implications of the rights view to be compatible with environmental causes.206
According to the rights view, animals should not be used for any type of scientific research,
whether it be biological/medical education, toxicology testing or new research. Prohibiting animal
research is the most contentious of these implications, since it research often justified in terms of saving
human lives, or promoting human health, whereas the other recommendations would likely not involve
any real harm to humans. Arguments in favor of using animals for research usually appeal to the
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necessity of animal models. Even those who think that animals have inherent value, or that we ought to
consider their welfare, often view it as a necessary evil. For example, Carl Cohen is a strong supporter
of animal research, while at the same time believing animals have inherent value (in the less strong
sense); because of this, he thinks that we ought to refrain from causing them unnecessary distress.207 The
majority of the debate regarding animal research has focused on what constitutes essential research; but
even if it were permissible to use animals in some cases of what we determined to be essential research,
the use of most animals would not qualify. Susan Finsen explains that “of the sixty to ninety million
who die each year in laboratories and classrooms in the U.S., many are used for nonessential reasons,
including classroom demonstrations, product testing, and psychological research.”208 Finsen also notes
that trying to decide what constitutes essential research presupposes the answer to the more fundamental
issue of whether experimenting on animals is morally acceptable at all.209 Similarly, it is common to use
utilitarian appeals to show that the benefits of animal experiments will outweigh the cost of the suffering
and deaths of the animals, but in a moral system that includes rights, using only utilitarian calculations
presupposes that animals do not have rights. We would not use these calculations to determine if it
would be acceptable to experiment on humans, because we believe that humans have rights and it that it
would simply be wrong. Furthermore, utilitarian calculations about the costs of animal research are
problematic since we usually do not know the amount of suffering involved for the animals. Bernard
Rollin explains that the majority of research done today does not allow for plausible predictions about
the outcomes of the experiments, particularly when it comes to predicting the effects they will have on
the animals.210
The debate on this issue (in the case of 'essential' research) is often framed as a direct conflict
between animal and human lives, but Regan disagrees that this is the case. We will see later that in
Cohen, The Animal Rights Debate, 5.
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apparent genuine dilemmas between animals and humans, he does favor humans, but in the case of
research, he does not see it as a direct conflict, and he argues that even in the cases of the most essential
research, we are already violating the rights of animals by taking them into laboratories, whereas
unhealthy human beings have not had their rights violated.211 Allowing experiments on animals is wrong
because it sanctions the routine violation of their rights.212
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Chapter 3: Conflicts of Rights
3.1 Conflicts of Rights Introduction
It is important to note that knowing individuals' rights will not necessarily provide us with
adequate information to determine the proper course of action in every case. When rights appear to
conflict with other rights, or with other strong moral considerations, it can be difficult to resolve the
problem merely by reference to rights.
Conflicts involving rights are inevitable in prima facie views of rights such as those of Raz or
Regan. Two different types of rights conflicts may be distinguished: external rights conflicts between
rights and non-rights considerations and internal rights conflicts where rights conflict with each other.213
Internal rights conflicts may be further differentiated into “inter-rights conflicts” in which the conflict
occurs between different rights and “intra-rights conflicts” in which equal rights are in conflict. In the
prima facie view, rights are morally obligatory at first glance, but when conflicts arise, we may
justifiably override them. This is the most popular position on rights: a moderate deontological position.
However, an important disagreement about rights is whether it even makes sense to think of them as
being able to be overridden at all, either by other rights, or by non-rights considerations. I will discuss
some of these issues, though I am not attempting to resolve this debate. For the purpose of this thesis, I
will accept Regan's moderate deontological view. My goal is to eliminate any methods of resolving
conflicts that are incompatible with the postulate of inherent value.

3.2 Some Problems of Moderate Deontological Views:
External rights conflicts relate to a criticism that deontological theories face – the absurdity of
catastrophic outcomes that may arise as a result of fulfilling strict obligations. Absolute deontologists
may accept this and claim that, nevertheless, the right thing to do is to fulfill the obligation (or not
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perform the forbidden action). Alternatively, moderate deontologists may take a less stringent approach
and argue that at a certain point, bad enough consequences can outweigh deontological constraints. This
is sometimes referred to as “threshold” deontology, the threshold being the point at which consequences
overtake deontological principles:
there are some acts that are morally wrong despite producing a net positive balance of
consequences; but if the positive balance of consequences becomes sufficiently great – especially
if it does so by averting horrible consequences as opposed to merely making people quite well
off – then one is morally permitted, and perhaps required, to engage in those acts that are
otherwise morally prohibited.214
In external rights conflicts between rights and non-rights considerations (such as utility), a certain
threshold of competing considerations could eventually cause a right to be justifiably overridden.
Similarly, in the resolution of internal rights conflicts, a certain number of less stringent rights may be
said to outweigh a lesser number of more important rights. Views such as these, in which deontological
constraints are not absolute, are examples of moderate deontological positions.
A problem of viewing rights as being violable in external rights conflicts, is that if non-rights
considerations (such as utility) are allowed to outweigh a right if they become great enough, then it
seems to undermine the value of a right. If rights are built from the notion of ultimate value (or of a
similar notion), and if their purpose is to protect individuals from the harmful effects of non-rights
reasoning that violates their ultimate value, then to permit this reasoning to eventually outweigh a right
is to allow the thing to occur that rights were meant to protect individuals from. This appears to diminish
the importance of a right. For this reason, Dworkin claims that if we are to take rights seriously, we must
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never allow utility to outweigh rights. For him, rights function as “trumps” over non-rights
considerations.215
We will see that Regan's theory is a different type of moderate deontological theory – it does not
allow any non-rights considerations to ever outweigh a right; overriding rights may only occur in
internal rights conflicts, and does not involve the use of thresholds. However, allowing the overriding of
rights in internal rights conflicts may also be problematic. According to Waldron, the purpose of rights
is to avoid the “trade-offs” of some people for a greater good that are permitted in utilitarian
calculations; rights express limits on the trading-off of the interests of individuals as a way to respect
individual freedom and well-being.216 These limits break down when rights conflict with each other
though, and trade-offs are again reintroduced.217 Waldon notes that “in identifying those interests that
are not to be sacrificed to the utilitarian calculus, we may still be picking out interests that are
incompatible with one another and so reproducing in the realm of rights the very issues that we tried to
avoid in the realm of social utility ” and that this may result in people feeling “as used and as exploited
when a 'right' of theirs is traded off against the 'rights' of others as they are when a similar choice is
made under the blander guise of maximizing satisfaction.”218
In order to avoid this problem, some rights theorists have attempted to formulate views of rights
in which they never conflict, and may therefore be absolute. Other theories that attempt to take rights
seriously while avoiding the problems of moderate deontology include absolute deontological theories
such as Kant's, Nozick's libertarian theory of rights, specificationist theories, or rule utilitarian theories.
Kant's view is often associated with the idea of absolute rights. Maxims that fail the first formulation of
the Categorical Imperative produce either contradictions in conception (logical contradictions) or
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contradictions of the will.219 Those duties that exist because failure to live up to them would produce
logical contradictions are perfect duties and those that exist because failing to live up to them would
produce contradictions of the will are imperfect duties.220 We have some latitude with imperfect duties
in how to fulfill them, but perfect duties we must always do according to Kant.221 These perfect duties,
can be associated with absolute duties. The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, where
Kant tells us to always treat persons as ends in themselves, may also be associated with an absolutism of
rights since it tells us that some things are absolutely wrong, despite any amount of good that would
come from them.222 Views involving absolute rights have difficulty dealing with situations where rights
conflict. Any absolute rights that are in conflict with each other will be difficult to resolve since
overriding one of them is not an option. This results in deadlocks where we have no morally acceptable
options to help resolve the conflict.
Another alternative to the prima facie view of rights is the one adopted by Nozick. He describes
the function of rights as “side constraints” on permissible actions in the pursuit of good consequences.223
For Nozick, rights are always negative; this means that there are fewer possible rights, and consequently
fewer possibilities for conflict. Rights are absolute and violations are never permitted in Nozick's view.
The drawback of this is that it does not adequately describe all of the rights most of us think exist.
Regan's theory involves some positive rights: for example, an individual's right not to be harmed may
involve a right to have someone come to their aid. Another way of avoiding the problem of rights
conflicts entirely that does not limit the number of rights we have in the way that Nozick's view does is
the specificationist view of rights. In this view there are no real rights conflicts: apparent conflicts
between rights, or between a right and non-rights considerations will turn out to not be true conflicts
after examining the circumstances to determine which party actually has a right. According to this view,
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when we speak in general rights terms, they are not true rights, they “are merely shorthand markers that
indicate where an actual right may exist if not outweighed by conflicting reasons.”224 There are implicit
exceptions that apply and “a right genuinely exists only in those instances not disallowed by one of the
disjunctive exceptive clauses.”225 When we speak of a right to life for example, we might actually mean
something like we have a right to life, unless we are threatening another person's life, or unless it
conflicts with a large number of people losing their lives etc. Rights in this view are absolute in their
narrower specific sense. Since they are able to remain absolute, this avoids the apparent problems of
contradiction that prima facie rights give rise to, and avoids the possibility of rights conflicts altogether.
Specificationist views require us thinking about rights in a different way than we typically do. In
prima facie views, individuals have general rights, which may be justifiably overridden, but for a
specificationist view, general rights are not true rights. A drawback of the specificationist view is that it
does not offer normative guidance for moral situations. It requires that we determine who had an actual
right in a given situation after moral deliberations, so it is not really the rights that help determine what
we ought to do, they merely mark our justified actions after using other types of moral reasoning.
Because of this, rights are not primary in our moral decision making, they have more of an explanatory
role: “instead of being the essential moral building blocks from which theorists argue to conclusions,
rights are actually moral edifices we argue towards.”226 A common criticism of the specificationist view
is that they do not account for the feelings of regret that would normally exist when a right is overridden
in a prima facie system of rights. Since apparent rights may turn out to not be rights at all, there seems to
be no reason for regret in not respecting apparent rights; we simply do the right thing by respecting the
actual right.
Some have tried to incorporate the idea of rights into utilitarian or other consequentialist
theories. For example, Scanlon advocates a type of rule utilitarianism: a “two-tier” utilitarian view that
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gives an important role to consequences while attempting to incorporate rights as serious considerations
that place limits on consequentialist reasoning.227 He notes that criticisms of utilitarianism often appeal
to rights which we cannot justify overriding by considerations of utility alone.228 He argues that rights
must be justified in some way though, and that the justification likely appeals to the interests of the
rights holders, so rights must involve what looks like consequentialist considerations in determining
what they permit and forbid, unless they are defined in an implausibly rigid way.229 He explains that key
factors in ethical theories include: how much discretion an agent has in satisfying moral requirements
and how much protection is offered to individuals through constraints on others.230 Traditional
utilitarianism has been considered to be extreme when it comes to these factors – it provides minimal
protection to individuals and is very specific in its requirements for moral agents.231 Deontological
theories would provide both better protection and greater latitude for the agent in terms of decision
making, but the cost of this is that the more claim-rights or liberties individuals have, the less control
others are able to exercise.232 He attempts to formulate a broadly consequentialist view of rights in
which they are justified through the states of affairs they promote.233 Regan is opposed to attempts to
incorporate rights into any rule utilitarian theory, since he argues that they could not adequately account
for our direct duties to moral patients.234
There are problems associated with each of these views of rights. At first glance, it would appear
that rights, if they are to play an important role, must be absolute; but on the other hand, if they are, we
may be forced to limit their range to an unacceptable level or face a large number of deadlocks. Prima
facie views do not allow for absolute rights, while specificationist views do not allow for general rights;
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and views of absolute, unalienable rights suffer from the problem of not offering guidance in situations
where rights conflict. This is part of an ongoing problem, but I will assume the acceptability of the prima
facie view that Regan advocates. Despite the issues that are associated with moderate deontological
positions, they are still the most commonly accepted views of rights. If we accept this type of theory, the
task of sorting out when to override rights remains.
Many philosophers believe that rights are important moral considerations, but that they cannot
make up the entirety of a moral theory. Regan explains that he intends only to provide moral principles
that must be included in a complete moral theory; his rights view does not exhaustively describe our
moral duties.235 It is likely the case that rights offer only a limited role in moral deliberations – we
cannot expect them to solve all types of moral conflicts and they cannot offer absolute protection. It is
important to keep these issues in mind though, and we should remember that if rights are to play a
meaningful role, they ought to be at least very important considerations – especially for a theory such as
Regan's which deals exclusively with basic rights, which are the most important type of rights. Rights in
a deontological theory should not simply be another value to be taken into consideration amongst others,
they are meant to provide special protection to individuals. Since rights are based on the equal ultimate
value of subjects-of-a-life, if they offer only limited ability to resolve conflicts, we ought to ensure that
if we are forced to make choices that violate rights, that we try to resolve the conflicts in a way that is as
egalitarian as possible.

3.3 Introduction to Regan's Principles for Overriding Rights
As a matter of justice, all moral patients and moral agents have a prima facie right not to be
harmed. Regan explains that since it is a prima facie right, it means that “(1) consideration of this right is
always a morally relevant consideration, and (2) anyone who would harm another, or allow others to do
so, must be able to justify doing so by (a) appealing to other valid moral principles and by (b) showing
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that these principles morally outweigh the right not to be harmed in a given case.”236 He discusses the
possibility that some individuals may have an absolute right not to be harmed, by considering either a
pacifist principle, where we ought to never harm anyone, or an innocence principle, where we ought to
never harm innocents, but argues that both of these principles are invalid.
He presents some different cases in which he thinks it would be justifiable to override prima facie rights:
1. In cases of self-defense by the innocent – for example, we may harm a violent attacker.237
2. To punish the guilty – Individuals may be fairly punished which may involve harm in the form of
fines, loss of liberty by being imprisoned etc. as long as they are treated with the respect they are due as
possessors of inherent value.238
3. Innocent Shields – For example, we have a right to harm an innocent in order to prevent the harm of
other innocents. Regan gives an example of a terrorist in a tank who has twenty-six hostages against a
wall, and the only way to stop him is to blow up the tank, but he has tied one hostage to the tank. In this
example, Regan claims that the right course of action is to sacrifice the one hostage in order to prevent
the deaths of the twenty-six, and that we would be failing to perform a moral obligation not to do so
since we must insure that the right of the twenty-six not to be harmed is not overridden if we are able
to.239
4. Innocent threats – For example, we may harm a young child with a gun shooting at people, even
though he is innocent according to Regan (since he is not a moral agent).240
Reasons 3 and 4 may apply to moral patients, including human moral patients and animals since
they involve innocents. Since 1 and 2 involve guilty individuals, they apply only to moral agents.241
Regan rejects the consequentialist “minimize harm” principle, whereby we must act to minimize the
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total aggregate of harm, since this can result in unfair outcomes for individuals who may be harmed to a
greater degree in order to save a greater number of people from suffering a much lesser degree of
harm.242 The principle treats individuals as mere receptacles of harms and benefits and this goes against
the reasoning of his rights view by failing to respect them as individuals with inherent value.243 Regan
offers two principles, derived from the respect principle, that are to be used in “prevention cases” where
we must choose between harming some innocent individuals: the minimize overriding of rights principle
and the worse-off principle.244 These are to be used instead of the minimize harm principle to determine
when it is permissible to override rights.

3.4.1

The Miniride Principle
The first principle for deciding when we may override the rights of innocents is the miniride (or

minimize overriding of rights) principle. This principle states that:
special considerations aside, when we must choose between overriding the rights of many who
are innocent or the rights of few who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be
harmed in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose to override the rights of the
few in preference to overriding the rights of the many.245
Regan believes that respecting the greatest number of comparable rights in situations where we must
choose to violate some ensures respecting everyone's individual rights equally – if we were to choose to
override the rights of the many, it would imply that we are counting the rights of the few more.246

3.4.2 Criticisms of the Miniride Principle
Despite arguing against the maximizing principle of utilitarianism and the consequentialist
“minimize harm” principle, Regan does claim that that numbers of individuals are an important
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consideration when trying to resolve conflicts of rights.247 Though Regan clearly wishes to separate his
theory from utilitarian ones, the miniride principle permits a type of rights-calculus in which the number
of rights violations are to be minimized. This may be an acceptable principle for a deontological theory
though; if all else is equal between the individuals in conflict, basing decisions on numbers ensures that
the fewest number of subjects-of-a-life will be harmed. It would remain distinct from utilitarianism
because rights would still offer protection in situations where they conflict with general utility or against
less important rights. Waldon notes that with both rights theories and utilitarianism, that individuals'
interests may be traded off, but that there are differences in the types of trade-offs. For some, the
problem with utilitarianism “is not so much that individual interests are traded off against one
another...The worry is that, in the utilitarian calculus, important individual interests may end up being
traded off against considerations which are intrinsically less important and which have the weight that
they do in the calculus only because of the numbers involved.”248 I think this describes Regan's concerns
about utilitarianism. Waldron claims that “on this account, what is wrong with utilitarianism is not that it
contemplates trade-offs but that it combines the idea of trade-offs with a doctrine of the quantitative
commensurability of all values. This means that each distinct value (every interest, every pleasure) can
be expressed as an arithmetical function of every other, since all can be reduced to a single metric of
satisfaction.”249 With rights, certain trade-offs are inevitable: “sometimes one life must be sacrificed so
that a greater number of lives may be saved.”250 So according to this account, Regan seems to be
resisting the proper type of trade-offs (ones based on utilitarian commensurability) a deontologist
should. However, for some, it may be the case that the problem with utilitarianism is not merely one of
the commensurability of values, and they may find the rights-calculus objectionable.
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Regan's theory allows for innocent individuals to be harmed, if doing so will prevent the same
harm to a greater number of innocents. In this sense, numbers of innocent individuals are a morally
relevant factor in considerations about overriding rights. Regan defends this assumption by discussing
John Taurek's paper “Should the Numbers Count?”, which raises objections to the idea that one innocent
may be sacrificed to save many.251 To illustrate the difference between their positions, Regan gives an
example where fifty-one miners are trapped and we have the choice to rescue fifty of them by using an
explosive that will kill one, or save one by killing fifty.252 Regan's assumption that numbers of
individuals is a relevant consideration would imply that we ought to sacrifice the one innocent miner to
save fifty, but Taurek disagrees with this assumption: in scenarios such as this, he argues that special
considerations aside, the mere addition of numbers is irrelevant and the right thing to do is to flip a coin
to decide whether to rescue the smaller or larger number.253 Taurek believes that the important
consideration is the significance of the loss to the individual suffering the loss, and that summing the
losses of individuals to form an aggregate of losses is not what should be done. In the miner example,
since the losses suffered by the one individual and the losses suffered by each of the fifty are equal,
Taurek would claim that each of them ought to have an equal chance of being rescued, and by tossing a
coin, each individual would have a fifty percent chance of living. If we allow numbers to count in this
situation, the one individual would have no chance of living. Regan's interpretation of Taurek's position
is that Taurek is trying to say that there is “no aggregate individual, a composite, as it were, of the fifty
individual miners, who will be harmed if we choose the option that causes the fifty miners to die, an
individual who will suffer harm fifty times as great as the harm suffered by the solitary miner, if we
were to choose the option that resulted in his death.”254 There is no individual who will be harmed fifty
times as great a loss as the sole miner, and since there is no such individual, we cannot let the numbers
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count, and ought not to.255 Regan argues that aggregating losses does make sense, even without an
individual suffering the total sum of losses.256 He thinks that a single coin toss in this situation would
give an unfair advantage to the single miner, and treats the group of fifty as a sole individual.257 He
argues that the equitable way of doing a coin toss would involve repeating it at least fifty times, one for
each of the miners against the single one, but that this would likely not give us useful information, since
the option to save select miners from the large group does not exist.258 Regan claims that the way to
succeed in treating all of the miners equitably as possessors of inherent value is to save the fifty at the
expense of the one.259
An important thing to note is that, in any situation involving numbers, the miniride principle will
make obligatory the duty to save the greater number of people. The miner example involves a relatively
large group of people, but Regan is committed to saying that even in situations where two lives conflict
with one, we are obliged to save the two. This is an unusual result for a moderate deontologist. Moderate
deontological theories permit consequences to play a role to some degree, but they tend to involve the
idea that one can only make a sacrifice if sufficiently large consequences are conflicting. According a
threshold deontologist “one may not kill or torture an innocent person in order to save two or three other
innocent people from death or torture – even though purely consequentialist considerations might dictate
otherwise...At a certain number of lives at risk – the Threshold – consequentialist moral principles
override deontological ones.”260 Larry Alexander explains that the reason threshold deontology remains
distinct from consequentialism is because consequentialists are committed to saying that one must be
sacrificed for two, but for threshold deontologists, there must be very bad competing consequences to
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justify harming an individual.261 This is not how Regan's theory works since the miniride principle
would tell us to sacrifice one to save two. So in some cases, the miniride principle produces outcomes
that are not typical of deontologists, and that are identical to what a consequentialist would advocate. It
is not the case that Regan's theory has a very “low threshold” because it is not that consequences
gradually build to a point where they become sufficiently weighty to permit consequentialist reasoning.
From the outset of comparable rights conflicting, Regan's principles dictate that we make decisions in
this way. Even so, this type of account would still be considered a deontological theory overall. Regan
insists that his principles themselves are not consequentialist and that the outcomes are based on appeals
to principles that “acknowledge and respect the equality of the individuals involved.”262 Oddly enough,
the threshold deontological position as described by Alexander would produce outcomes that are more
characteristically deontological, yet consequentialist reasoning is admitted to overtake deontological
considerations in this account; Regan, however, seems to resist saying that his theory relies on
consequentialist reasoning at any point. Regan's solution has the benefit of avoiding the arbitrariness of
thresholds, yet the miniride principle results in outcomes that one would expect more from a utilitarian
since the protection offered to individuals is weaker than typical deontological theories.
Taurek's position argues merely for the permissibility of saving the smaller number in some
cases and opposes a principle making it obligatory for us to always save the larger number. Tyler
Doggett defends Taurek against criticisms by Kamm and Scanlon, who disagree with Taurek's ideas
about the relevance of numbers. Doggett discusses two options for when we are faced with scenarios
where we have a choice between saving a smaller or larger number of individuals, where the stakes are
equal for everyone and where we have no special obligations: the “Must Save Many” option where we
are required to save the many, and the “Can Save Few” option where we are required to save someone,
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but permitted to save the many or the few.263 These options differ in that one is an obligation and the
other is an option. This is an important distinction that we ought to keep in mind, because even if a
course of action generally produces the best outcome most of the time and should definitely be a
permissible option, we may not want to make it obligatory (it may be wrong to completely forbid the
alternative action). Taurek and Doggett defend the Can Save Few option. Doggett claims that the
arguments of Kamm and Scanlon are important because they offer one of the few nonconsequentialist
defenses of why Must Save Many is true and Can Save Few is false, but in the end, he finds that their
arguments fail and actually lend support to Taurek's position that Can Save Few is true.264 He claims
that the problems with Kamm and Scanlon's position that Must Save Many is true would generalize to
other nonconsequentialist explanations. He thinks that the only explanation for Must Save Many would
have to be consequentialist, or that otherwise, Can Save Few must be true, and he believes that the latter
is the case.265
If Doggett is correct, by incorporating the rights calculus into his theory, Regan would be
committed to a consequentialist explanation for it. Dale Jamieson supports this view, claiming that
Regan has “failed to develop a compelling and dramatic alternative to utilitarian theories”, particularly
when it comes to the way Regan deals with overriding rights.266 He thinks that Regan must alter his
theory, and likely in a way that would make it more consequentialist. Jamieson discusses Regan's miner
example, and how the miniride principle requires us to sacrifice one person in order to save fifty. Since
it allows us to harm or kill innocents, even when our own life is not at stake, he claims that these
outcomes are irreconcilable with the idea of those involved having equal inherent value.267 Due to the
fact that the collapsing mine example involves a force of nature, according to Regan's theory, no one's
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rights are being violated; this makes it even more difficult to justify that the right action is to kill one
person in order to save fifty.268 Jamieson claims that the most plausible reason for accepting this as the
correct action is through appeal to consequences, but Regan justifies it based on respecting the equality
of the individuals involved.269 According to Jamieson, there is not a clear connection between respect
for the individual involved and the outcome Regan suggests. He asks “why shouldn't this respect lead us
to kill none, rather than one or fifty?”270 The miner scenario is not even one in which we are really
forced to choose between killing one or killing fifty, there is the option of doing nothing at all. Jamieson
thinks that Regan's theory must move further towards an abolitionist deontological theory or towards a
consequentialist theory and believes that the latter is more plausible.271 Jamieson claims that his
criticisms are a problem for any theory dealing with rights, duties and consequences, while rejecting
consequentialism and absolutist deontology; he believes that amending Regan's theory to make it more
plausible would likely result in one that is closer to consequentialist morality.272
The similarity of the miniride principle to consequentialist moral principles has led to some
misunderstandings of Regan's theory. Steven Davis has claimed that according to Regan's animal rights
theory, we should be eating diets that include meat, particularly from grass-fed cows. He does
calculations to show that the number of animals killed if everyone were to follow a vegan diet would be
higher than the omnivorous model he suggests, due to the many animals killed accidentally in the
process of harvesting crops. He bases his arguments on what he terms 'The Least Harm Principle':
“whenever we find ourselves in a situation where all the options at hand will produce some harm to
those who are innocent, we must choose that option that will result in the least total sum of harm.”273
This principle is actually the 'minimize harm principle' which Regan explicitly rejects in The Case for
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Animal Rights as a consequentialist principle that treats individuals as mere receptacles of value.274 In
fact, Regan's miniride and worse-off principles are offered as way of avoiding having to resort to using
this minimize harm principle in prevention cases.275 Regan clearly states that he does not believe in
aggregating harm, but the similarity in outcomes of his miniride principle the minimize harm principle is
what led to this confusion. The rights-calculus of the miniride principle allows for the equal, separate
harms of individuals being totaled, but this is different than a principle telling us to minimize harm. One
may be harmed in a variety of ways that do not necessarily constitute a violation of one's rights, and the
minimize harm principle would take these harms into account whereas the miniride principle would not.
Also, side-effects, such as the effects that actions have on those not directly involved would be relevant
with the minimize harm principle but not with the miniride principle. As it turns out though, the two
different principles result in the same outcome in this case, since Davis restricts his discussion of harm
to numbers of animals killed, and makes no attempts to distinguish levels of harm experienced by the
animals, or possible side-effects. Calculations about the numbers of individuals killed will thus be
identical to calculations about minimizing harm. However, using the wrong principle allows Davis to
avoid some important restrictions on the miniride principle.
Andy Lamey explains that Davis does not allow for the morally relevant distinction between
accidental and deliberate harms.276 The miniride principle applies only to violations of rights, so for it to
be applicable to the harvester deaths, these would have to be considered rights violations. The
distinction between accidental and deliberate harms would not be relevant to a consequentialist, but
deontologists may hold such a position. One might argue that the harvester deaths are not true accidents
since they are foreseen, but even so, deontologists sometimes make a distinction between the foreseen
and intended harms of our actions. The Doctrine of Double Effect principle states that this is a morally
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relevant distinction that can explain the permissibility of foreseen, but unintended harms.277 If we accept
this principle, the harvester deaths would be permissible (not rights violations) and the deaths of the
food animals would be impermissible. Given Regan's analysis of rights violations as they occur in
research – that we violate the rights of animals as soon as we bring them into laboratories with a goal for
human ends, I think that he could argue something similar about this case. The animals we kill for food
have had their rights violated from the start to be raised to provide food for humans, but the animals
killed accidentally in the harvest have not, since we never intended to use them for human ends. If this is
the case, Regan's actual principle would only permit the minimization of the deaths of the food animals.
We may have a duty to try to prevent the deaths of the animals by the harvesters, but since duties of
justice are most important, Regan has reason to justify advocating veganism, even if Davis' conclusions
about the numbers of animals killed are correct.

3.5.1 The Worse-Off Principle
The second principle Regan introduces is the worse-off principle:
Special considerations aside, when we must decide to override the rights of the many or the
rights of the few who are innocent, and when the harm faced by the few would make them
worse-off than any of the many would be if any other option were chosen, then we ought to
override the rights of the many.278
Though it is stated in terms of the “few” or “many”, different numbers are not essential to the principle,
it could apply to situations where there are equal numbers, or even simply for deciding between two
individuals.279 This principle, Regan claims, highlights the fundamental difference between the rights
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view and the consequentialist minimize harm principle.280 While the miniride principle deals with
situations where the harms faced by innocents are prima facie comparable, the worse-off principle is for
dealing with situations where the harms faced are not prima facie comparable, and in this type of case,
numbers do not count.281 If overriding the rights of a thousand innocent individuals would be less of a
harm to each of them individually than to override the right of one, it is the right thing to do.282 The sum
of the harms of the different sides is irrelevant, as it is only the magnitude of harm that is important for
this principle.

3.5.2 Criticisms of the Worse-off Principle
Dale Jamieson is critical of the worse-off principle and thinks it ought to be discarded. He thinks
that Regan has ignored cumulative considerations, since not everyone starts at the same level of wellbeing. For example, in a hypothetical scenario where we must cripple a million people or give one
person who is already crippled a headache, we should cripple the million people because the person
crippled with a headache would be worse-off.283 He points out that the worse-off principle can also
conflict with the miniride principle since the former deals with comparative positions and the latter with
comparative harms:
Imagine a case in which we must either blind six people or one. Since the harms are comparable
and therefore the numbers count, the Miniride Principle instructs us to blind the one. But suppose
that the one is also deaf. If she were blinded, she would be worse off than any of the six would
be if they were blinded. The Worse-Off Principle would thus tell us to blind the six.284
Jamieson claims that if we revise the worse-off principle to be in terms of comparative harms like the
miniride principle, it would still be problematic: if we had to choose between a million people losing an
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arm or a single person losing two arms, we should harm the million.285 The worse-off principle functions
as a way of prioritizing rights based on the amount of harm their violations would produce. This is the
type of counterintuitive example that is possible when ranking rights in this way; however, this is
accepted as the proper method of resolution for some rights theorists. A way around this problem is to
allow for a certain threshold of lesser rights to outweigh a greater right. For example, in this case, a
lesser harm to a million people would outweigh a greater harm to one. But the incorporation of
thresholds into the theory allows the aggregating of lesser harms that utilitarianism permits, and which
Regan is firmly against. For Regan, rights are meant to avoid situations where a greater harm may be
outweighed by a number of lesser harms.
Regan discusses the possible objection that the rights view is inconsistent, as it claims to not give
moral relevance to consequences, yet the worse-off principle bases decisions on the amount of harm
(who will be harmed most) which is a type of consequence and the miniride principle minimizes
numbers of individuals harmed.286 His response to this criticism is that for the rights view, determining
what is morally right and wrong cannot be based merely on what will bring about the best (or least bad)
aggregate consequences.287 He states that “the rights view rejects any and all consequentialist theories
because any and all assume that consequences and consequences alone determine moral right, wrong
and duty”.288 Regan claims that the rights view does not hold that consequences are morally irrelevant,
especially for determining how much those involved will be harmed.289 This, Regan believes, is
fundamentally different than aggregating consequences to determine moral obligations because this
would treat individuals as mere receptacles of value.290 Despite this insistence, his principles for
overriding rights seem to operate in a very different way than before rights conflict, and the type of
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reasoning that Regan appeals to in this second, more critical level, sometimes appears very similar to
consequentialist reasoning. While the rights view is clearly different from an entirely utilitarian theory,
if the principles we use at the point where rights conflict are consequentialist, it makes the separation
between the two types of theories less pronounced, especially since most of our difficult moral decisions
involve conflicts. This relates to the problems of moderate deontological theories in general, but as long
as Regan's theory provides some constraints on producing good states of affairs, it remains distinct from
consequentialism.

3.6.1 Side-Effects and Special Considerations
For Regan's rights view, side-effects are not a relevant reason to override rights.291 This is an
important distinction between the rights view and consequentialism. In consequentialist theories, sideeffects, such as interested parties in someone's well-being can affect what we determine to be the
morally correct outcome, since aggregate consequences are what is important.292 This could result in
injustice to an individual who may be harmed in order to produce the outcome with best aggregate
results for all interested parties.293 By counting only those directly involved, and not those who benefit
as a side-effect, the rights view avoids some of the worst forms of moral prejudice that may be allowed
for through utilitarian reasoning.294 Appealing to aggregate good consequences for interested parties is a
way often used to justify the use of animals in medical experiments, but Regan argues that we ought to
abandon this type of moral reasoning. According to Regan, the harm of death is “a function of the
number and variety of opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses” and thus there is “no credible basis on
which to claim that the death of a normal, adult animal is not a greater loss, and thus a greater harm, than
the death of a less aware, retarded human, one who possesses fewer desires, less competence to act
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intentionally, and is less responsive to others and to the environment generally.”295 Utilitarians may
claim, using appeals to aggregate balance of good for all those affected, that there are reasons to opt to
use animals for terminal research, even if death is more of a harm for them, and this would be a
speciesist practice.296 Utilitarians therefore lack the basis to argue against animal experimentation, but
the rights view has such a basis because the relevant factor in the rights view is the magnitude of harm to
individuals directly involved.297 Furthermore, utilitarians lack the necessary facts in such situations to
determine which actions would be optimific, but the rights view does not require these facts to create
prohibitions on speciesist practices. 298
According to Regan, a factor that is relevant to the determination of when it is acceptable to
override rights is the idea of “special considerations” which can add to or detract from the strength of a
right. Regan considers the possible objection that the principles of his rights view may lead to us having
to do things that go against our considered beliefs, such as sparing a stranger who would be harmed
slightly more than a close loved one who would be harmed, but to a very slight lesser degree.299 He
agrees that this is counterintuitive, and agrees that we ought to give special consideration to those who
are close to us; but he explains that the reason we should choose in favor of our loved one is not because
of reasons of aggregating their harm with our harm, because this would be treating everyone involved as
mere receptacles, and also, because allowing side-effects to matter would open the possibility of letting
such considerations matter in any case where others have interests in the outcome but are not directly
affected.300 Special considerations can justifiably override his other two principles for dealing with
conflicts of rights. We have a “special moral relationship” with those we are close to such as friends and
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family members, somewhat like a contractual arrangement.301 The duties to our loved ones are a type of
acquired duty; normally we help those closest to us the most, and it would be wrong to ignore these
special relationships.302 Close relationships do not, however, give us permission to always choose to
favor our loved ones: if the harms differ a great deal in magnitude and a stranger would be harmed a
great deal more, we should opt to override the right of our loved one.303 Special considerations may
involve the addition of rights beyond basic rights that must be considered, or they may detract from the
normal rights of individuals. For example, those who voluntarily engage in high risk or competitive
activities may have their right not to be made worse off waived, if it would involve violating the rights
of those who choose not to partake in such activities.304 One final special consideration is the historical
background of a situation: “if some of those involved are in their present predicament because other
involved individuals have violated their basic rights in the past, then these past violations make a moral
difference in the application of the miniride and worse-off principles.”305 Here Regan makes room for
giving precedence to innocents over those who are not. By adding to the strength of some individuals'
claims and detracting from the strength of the claims of others, special considerations allow us to not
apply his principles for overriding rights in the usual way.

3.6.2 Special Considerations Criticisms
Special considerations appear to make Regan's principles more acceptable as they give us room
to break away from the miniride and worse-off principles, allowing us to do things that conform more to
our intuitions. In this way, we are permitted to give special treatment to our loved ones. Special
considerations are a fairly vague concept though, it is not clear how close one must be to receive special
consideration adding to their rights, nor is it clear what would count as risky behavior enough to detract
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from rights. Special considerations add an additional complexity to the resolution of rights conflicts; a
lack of clarity about what considerations count further complicates the matter. We do not want to allow
special considerations to overtake the importance of impartial principles, leaving the agent with too
much leeway to opt out of the principles. Regan expresses concerns about the utilitarian incorporation of
side effects of everyone involved because of the possibility of bigotry; however, allowing special
considerations to overtake the other principles too freely has the potential to result in the same type of
thing. If we can extend special treatment to our family and friends, may we also extend special treatment
to our neighbors, members of a community of like-minded people (one's religion, for example), people
from our own country, race, species? On one hand it seems good to say that we have extra duties to
those we are close to, but at the same time, people can have biases that we do not want to permit,
especially when it comes to overriding someone else's rights.
Regan also provides an example of when special considerations could detract from someone's
rights. He responds to an objection that his rights view (particularly the worse-off principle) requires
supererogatory acts as obligatory duties. He gives an example of a race car driver in an accident who
will die unless all available medical personnel work to save him, and this would divert their medical
assistance from four other people who will suffer a significant, but not fatal harm. In this case, people
might argue that the medical personnel as well as the four victims of the less severe harm should accept
that the right thing to do is to save the driver since he would be worse-off, but that this is unreasonable
to expect of them as it is too demanding. Regan's response to this objection is that the “special
considerations” proviso allows us to opt to aid the four, since there is a special consideration involved:
the driver voluntarily undertook a high-risk behavior. By doing so, he waived his right not to be made
worse-off. Regan stresses that this is not consequentialist, because our reasons for believing this are not
because the sum of the four would exceed the harm done to the one, but because people who voluntarily
engage in these types of activities must understand that they are waiving their right not to be made
62

worse-off if it will mean violating the rights of those who choose not to partake in such activities. Again,
the issue of what counts as high risk behavior is vague. Aside from high risk activities such as race car
driving, Regan also claims that competitive activities such as running in long-distance races count as a
special consideration that would subtract from the claims of individuals. If something like running in a
race may subtract from our rights, it seems that there would be a large number of activities which we
could refer to as special considerations. There are a range of risks involved in many activities people do
on a regular basis that seem just as risky – many sports have some risk involved, driving a car is a risk
etc. Both types of special considerations (ones that add to the strength of our duties, and those that
detract from them) greatly complicate our determinations of morally right actions in Regan's theory. The
second type would not apply to animals or other moral patients, since they are not held accountable for
their actions, but the first type has the potential to be used to justify biases against animals.
It does seem like a strong point of Regan's theory that it allows agents some freedom in their
decision making when it comes to conflicts of rights, but setting limits on this is difficult. This issue
relates to a general problem with Regan's methods of conflict resolution: it is not always clear how the
different principles and considerations work together. In some situations it is clear which principle to use
to resolve conflicts, but recalling Jamieson's example of blinding six people or one who is deaf, it is not
always obvious which principle should have priority. Special considerations complicate this further by
allowing us to opt out of using a principle if the conditions permit.
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Chapter 4: The Lifeboat Problem
4.1 Introduction to the Lifeboat Case
A particularly difficult example of a prevention case that Regan discusses is a lifeboat case in
which four normal adult humans and one dog occupy a boat that has room for only four individuals;
everyone on board will perish if one individual is not removed. Regan’s use of his principles for
overriding rights to resolve the lifeboat case has been a source of controversy, though he believes that it
does not merit the amount of attention it has received based on its relative importance to his theory.306
Regan's solution makes use of the worse-off principle, and he argues that since death for a human would
make them worse-off than it would for a dog, the dog ought to be sacrificed. Death is worse for a human
than for a dog, according to Regan, based on his analysis of the harm of death as being “a function of the
number and variety of opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses.”307 He claims that our intuitions would
tell us that the dog should be sacrificed, and that “no reasonable person would deny that the death of any
of the four humans would be a greater prima facie loss, and thus a greater prima facie harm, than would
be a true in the case of the dog.”308 Everyone on the boat has equal inherent value and an equal prima
facie right not to be harmed, but since death for the dog is less than that of the humans, the humans
would be made worse-off by death.309 Regan claims that sacrificing the dog is the best way to respect
everyone's inherent value; it does not conflict with the dog's equal prima facie right not to be harmed
because the recognition of this right requires that we do not count unequal harms equally.310 If we were
to save the dog, Regan claims we would be giving it more than it is due because we would be counting
its lesser harm as equal or greater to the harm done to the human, which is in fact greater.311 This case
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would hold for any number of dogs: even if we had to throw a million dogs overboard to save the four
humans, this is what should be done because it is wrong to aggregate harms.312
In this chapter, I will argue that this method of conflict resolution is unacceptable given the
assumptions that animals have equal inherent value and basic rights. Regan is mistaken when he claims
that sacrificing the dog is the correct way of respecting the equal inherent value of all the individuals on
the lifeboat. Instead, it ought to be regarded as a situation in which we have equally strong duties to save
each of the individuals.
4.2 Analogy to Research Criticism
Regan responds to some criticisms of the lifeboat case in the preface of the book. A number of
critics have claimed that Regan is inconsistent when he suggests that the dog ought to be sacrificed,
while opposing the use of animals for research. Of all the recommendations implied by Regan's theory
(stopping hunting, eating meat etc.) animal experimentation is the most controversial; it is the only one
that involves the prevention of human deaths. If it could be argued that medical research is analogous to
the lifeboat example (by claiming that without sacrificing animals in research, humans will die) this part
of Regan's theory would indeed seem inconsistent. If this were the case, Regan would have to change
the way he resolves the lifeboat case, or he would have to change his position to allow for some animal
experimentation, which would be problematic for his animal rights theory. I believe that Regan's
solution to the lifeboat case is problematic for other reasons; however, I agree with Susan Finsen in
thinking that this lifeboat-research analogy does not hold, and thus, “the demand for abolition of animal
research is not marred by consistency on this score.”313
Finsen claims that this criticism may be addressed in two ways in order to maintain an
abolitionist view on animal experimentation:
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1. It could be argued that Regan's principles of conflict resolution do not imply that it is
generally appropriate to sacrifice the dog in the lifeboat scenario.
2. It can be argued that science is different from the lifeboat case and that the analogy is thus
indefensible.314
Finsen explains that accepting (1) alone would not be enough to establish an entirely abolitionist
position on research, but it would show that his theory implies that the way we currently discriminate
and use only animals for it is wrong. Since the worse-off principle says that we ought to choose to harm
the individual(s) who would be harmed the least, and it does not discriminate based on species, then
there would be times were it would be justified to experiment on humans if science is like a lifeboat.315
Furthermore, she points out that given Regan's special consideration of innocence, we may end up
having to choose to save animals over humans much of the time, considering the innocence of animals
and the history of oppression of animals by humans.316 Thus, if science were a lifeboat, establishing this
point would not be sufficient to rule out either animal experimentation or human experimentation.317
Finsen attempts to show that we can maintain the abolitionist position on animal research by arguing for
(2) to show that science is not like a lifeboat at all. I am in agreement with Finsen that (2) is true, but I
also think that (1) is true, for reasons I will discuss later in this chapter. I will first discuss arguments for
(2) before defending reasons in support of (1). I think that the particular reasons in support of (1) also
happen to imply that research is indefensible on both animals and humans.
L.W. Sumner argues that if Regan thinks a million dogs should be sacrificed to save one human,
then he cannot oppose using the same number of animals for medical research, if doing so would save at
least one human.318 Regan's explains that he thinks Sumner is mistaken in generalizing what should be
done in exceptional cases to what should be done routinely; medical research is not an exceptional case
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as it is performed on millions of animals each year.319 More importantly though, Regan says that
because animals used for experiments have already had their rights violated to be taken to a laboratory
in the first place, that this makes the scenario very different than lifeboat cases in which no one has had
their rights violated to arrive in their predicament.320 In bringing an animal into a laboratory with the
intention to harm it, we are already violating the animal's right to be treated with respect; they have been
coerced whereas the dog in the lifeboat has not.321
Singer suggests that experimenting on a diseased dog to save humans suffering from the same
disease would be allowed according to Regan's theory.322 Similarly Jamieson argues that Regan is
committed to thinking that if a million dogs should be thrown overboard in a lifeboat, if we had to
experiment on some members of a population of dogs and humans, all with a fatal illness, that any
numbers of dogs should be experimented on in order to save the humans.323 Jamieson thinks that this
analogy still holds despite Regan's insistence on the difference between the cases based on coercion,
because in this example, none of those involved were coerced to become at risk.324 Regan insists,
however, that “when one solitary animal is brought into a laboratory, there to be used in pursuit of
human benefits, that animal's right to be treated with respect has been violated.”325 So although the
animals were not coerced to become infected with a disease, using them as a means to save human lives
by experimenting on them is still a violation of their rights. Finsen is in agreement with Regan that
coercion can be a relevant factor. She claims that although coercion is not a relevant factor when it
comes to duties of assistance (i.e. in Jamieson's boulder example, it is irrelevant how the man got there,
we have an obligation to warn him), it is relevant in conflicts between rights bearers.326 Edwards has
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argued that, even if coercion is a relevant factor though, a dog in a lifeboat would have had to have been
coerced to get in the boat since humans made the decision to put the dog in the boat.327 Regan's response
is that not all decisions we make on behalf of dogs constitute coercion, but even if we always do act
coercively in making decisions for them, not all types of coercion would violate an animal's rights and
we would have to distinguish between coercive decisions that do and those that do not.328
Regan gives three necessary conditions for something to qualify as a lifeboat case:
1. The threat of immediate demise for all parties involved, given that someone is not sacrificed
(equal risk);
2. Lack of any alternatives to the sacrifice; and
3. Reasonable expectation that the sacrifice will spare the lives of those involved in the
lifeboat who are not sacrificed.329
Both Finsen and Regan argue that animal research does not fit any of the three criteria for lifeboat cases.
In research there is no threat of immediate demise for all involved – the animals would not have been at
risk had they not been taken to be used in experiments. In the lifeboat there are also no alternatives
available to us, whereas in the case of research there are. In terms of the third condition, research
typically involves time lags between when it is performed on an animal and when it would have effects
that might help people. It would be very unlikely that any new research would affect the humans already
at risk, and as Finsen explains, “if you are drowning and no lifeboat is in sight, you are not in a
lifeboat.”330 There may be certain exceptional cases involving research that appear at first glance to fit
these conditions, but Finsen believes there are further reasons why the analogy does not hold, which are
necessary to maintain a complete abolitionist stance. Finsen believes that the denial of the sciencelifeboat analogy requires looking to the exceptional nature of the lifeboat where there is a lack of
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alternatives versus the foreseeable inevitability of death and disease.331 Since death and disease are
foreseeable, the institutions created to deal with them have the possibility of ensuring that the way they
handle these things does not violate anyone's rights. One further reason that distinguishes research from
the lifeboat is that the death of someone in the lifeboat case would happen relatively quickly whereas
animal experimentation is estimated in the majority of cases to cause “prolonged and unalleviated
suffering.”332 These reasons, Finsen believes, are enough to show that science is not a lifeboat and that
Regan's recommendations are consistent with his principles for resolving the lifeboat case.

4.3.1 The Harm of Death Criticism
Evelyn Pluhar offers a different type of criticism regarding Regan's handling of the lifeboat
situation. She claims that Regan is actually consistent, and agrees that the dog ought to be sacrificed, but
she argues that he is committed to an unacceptable principle: “any sentient nonhuman that we know of
would be harmed less by death than would a human.”333 She claims that this principle is unacceptable
because it is speciesist (arbitrarily discriminatory based on species membership).334 Regan claims that
sacrificing the dog is not speciesist because the decision to throw it overboard is not based on species
membership, it is based on determining losses for each individual.335 He argues that he is not committed
to this principle because certain humans, a comatose one for example, would be sacrificed before an
animal if the harm of death for the animal would be greater than for the human.336 This is a point that
many would see as a strength of Regan's theory. Andy Lamey, for example, thinks that it is good that
Regan ranks the death of a human as worse than the death of any animal, believing that “it is difficult to
imagine a theory of animal protection being plausible if it implied that human and animal deaths were
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morally indistinguishable.”337 Lamey thinks that Regan's handling of the lifeboat case is a good way of
countering the objections of critics who say that those advocating animal protection are seeking to
elevate animals to the same level as people.338 But the lifeboat case deals with a conflict between bearers
of equal rights to life; having a radically egalitarian outcome in this case is not necessarily an absurd
conclusion.
Regan seems to be at least committed to this modified version of Pluhar's principle: any sentient
nonhuman that we know of would be harmed less by death than would a normal human. This is not
necessarily a speciesist principle, if there are morally relevant non-arbitrary reasons for making this
claim, but I believe that this modified principle is problematic either way. Many would likely find
Regan's claim that death is less of a harm for certain human beings (the severely mentally challenged,
for example) morally objectionable. Also, if we accept Regan's analysis of the harm of death as being
different amongst subjects-of-a-life, it seems that there are plenty of other reasons we could use to make
similar principles to distinguish between different, relatively normal humans. For example, we might say
that death is normally more of a harm for someone who is happier or more intelligent than another. Or,
as Gary Francione asks, “If we can depart from the assumption that like harms have like effects when
the fifth passenger is a dog, why not assume that the like harm of death will have a different impact on
the four talented survivors than it will on the fifth untalented survivor because death for the former will
foreclose opportunities for satisfaction in a way that it will not for the latter? ”339 It seems that Regan
would like to restrict this concept of a varied harm of death for human beings to extreme cases (a very
old versus very young person, or a severely mentally challenged person versus a normal one) but this is
arbitrary and thus unfair to these individuals. If he restricts this reasoning to these types of cases, Regan
may have avoided the charge of speciesism, but instead may be being discriminatory and unfair to an
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even larger subset of individuals with inherent value. If, on the other hand, he allows this reasoning for
everyone, it would result in extremely complicated decisions since there are a number of different
capacities that exist to different degrees in subjects-of-a-life. Either way (and more importantly), in
making these types of judgments, we are essentially determining whose life is more valuable, and this
seems morally objectionable and incompatible with everyone involved having equal inherent value.
There is no non-arbitrary reason to restrict this reasoning to cases of humans versus animals, and doing
so would be speciesist, but I think that most would agree that it is unacceptable to use this type of
reasoning when it comes to human beings. For these reasons, I think that the 'harm of death'
consideration needs to be discarded.
On one hand, Regan seems to insist that we ought not confuse an individual's value (their
inherent value) with the value of their experiences (intrinsic values), but in reasoning that the dog ought
to be sacrificed in the lifeboat, he seems to allow intrinsic values to be the deciding factor. Jamieson
notes that this “should make us wonder exactly what work is done by the claim that dogs and normal
humans have the same inherent value.”340 If inherent value is to play an important role in Regan's
theory, Jamieson thinks that it should offer protection from the reasoning that allows for the content of
individuals' lives to determine their moral entitlements.341 Regan believes that the selection of the dog
does not conflict with recognizing the animal's equal inherent value because the dog is not harmed on
the grounds that the aggregate harm would be greater for the humans.342 Though it is true that Regan's
reasoning does not rely on aggregating harms, aggregating harms is not the only way to fail to respect
the inherent value of an individual.
When Regan initially established the ideas of subjects-of-a-life and inherent value as categorical
concepts, our varying capacities were said to not affect this; he claimed that it would be perfectionistic
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to allow varied capacities affect the degree of inherent value individuals have.343 In cases such as this
one however, varying capacities ultimately determine who will be sacrificed – not because one's greater
capacity for experience implies a higher degree of inherent value, but because our varying capacities are
supposed to affect the harm that death is for an individual. The “harm of death” concept (a function of
the number and variety of opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses) acts as an intermediate step
between the intrinsic values of individuals and the application of the worse-off principle. This is what
enables Regan to argue that according to his worse-off principle, animals ought to be sacrificed versus
humans in conflict situations due to their lesser capacities. So although basing decisions about who
ought to be sacrificed directly on intrinsic values would be perfectionistic and wrong according to
Regan, the fact that the intermediate 'harm of death' step relies entirely on intrinsic values allows him to
sneak these factors back in to become the deciding factors in conflicts involving death. In applications of
his worse-off principle where death is involved, it becomes morally obligatory to sacrifice the
individuals with lesser intrinsic values. This seems only superficially different than claiming that
intrinsic values ought to be the deciding factor directly.
A number of critics have pointed to an inconsistency between Regan's claim that subjects-of-alife have equal inherent value, and his principles for resolving the lifeboat case. Gary Francione thinks
that it would be very difficult to expand the protection of animals significantly with a theory that relied
on comparative harms.344 He notes that Peter Carruthers argues against according moral status to
animals and bases his argument in large part on the way that both Regan and Peter Singer admit that
humans are harmed more than animals when foreclosed from satisfying opportunities.345 Carruthers
argues that “we have a commonsense moral view that human life cannot be weighed against animal life
that is so strong that even Regan and Singer affirm the validity of this view.”346 Francione criticizes the

343
344
345
346

Ibid., 237.
Francione, “Comparable Harm...,” 82.
Ibid.
Ibid.

72

use of comparable harms in general (not only the harm of death) as being perfectionistic and inconsistent
with a radical egalitarian theory. He points out that being a subject-of-a-life and having inherent value
are both categorical and equal concepts; but harm, for Regan, is not : “between the human and
nonhuman occupants in the lifeboat, the same harm is deemed to be qualitatively different.”347 It is not
only empirically difficult to make the assessments necessary to compare harms, but more importantly,
“any such consideration of supposed empirical facts about harm in this regard is inconsistent with what
it is necessary to disregard in the formulation of those theoretical postulates.”348 It is important to note
that comparing harms may be acceptable in some circumstances – when we are comparing magnitudes
of different harms to assess who would be harmed less. Arguing that the same type of harm would
produce different magnitudes between different individuals is what is problematic. I think that Francione
is correct when he argues that “accepting a theory of comparable harm based at least in part on the
presence or absence of certain virtues may be the same as arguing that the being who is harmed less has
an inherent value that is different from, and less than, the one harmed more.”349 The harm of death
consideration in Regan's theory is incompatible with his notion that subjects-of-a-life have equal
inherent value.
One point that is not clear regarding Regan's account of the harm of death is whether his
reasoning in these situations could be extended to other types of conflicts that do not involve death. If
intrinsic values become the deciding factor in determining the harm of death, could they also play a role
in problems involving other harms? It is true that death is a unique type of harm in that it is an extinction
of any future for an individual. But there are things that are perhaps as bad as, or worse than death for an
individual, such as torture. Since torture does not necessarily involve this extinction of future
possibilities, presumably the same sort of decision making process for resolving conflicts cannot apply;
Regan would not be able to justify torturing an animal over humans in the same way that he can justify
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killing an animal over a human. But it seems counterintuitive to claim that we may justifiably sacrifice
an animal to be killed, yet we may not when it comes to torture. If we decide that this outcome is
unreasonable, and describe an account of torture in which torture would be more of a harm for humans
than for animals, since it does not involve foreclosed opportunities the way that death does, it would
seem to be an ad hoc way of conforming the analysis of harm with intuitions that terrible harms are
worse for humans than they are for animals. If we allow this type of analysis, it seems likely that we
could also describe lesser harms in similar ways. For example, the harm of having one's arm cut off
could be described as being worse for one who would lose more opportunities to use their arm (we
might conclude that having an arm cut off is more of a harm for a talented painter rather than an average
person, for example). Clearly this would allow perfectionist reasoning to play a major role in his theory,
but Regan is firmly opposed to perfectionism. This could also possibly result in an analysis of harms
where most are worse for humans than for animals, which would mean animals are not protected equally
by equivalent rights. But even if the harm of death is only worse for humans in situations involving
death, it is still problematic.
Edwards agrees that Regan's harm of death analysis is flawed – he claims that Regan forgets his
distinction between inherent and intrinsic value when he analyzes the harm of death, as “he focuses
exclusively on the loss of opportunities for the realization of intrinsic value ('satisfaction').”350 But if
they have inherent value, the harm of death is much more than a mere loss of opportunities for
satisfaction; it also is “the extinction and loss of all the inherent worth of being a unique subject-of-alife.”351 This extinction of inherent value is just as great a loss in the dog as in the humans and it seems
like this should be the most important feature of the harm of death (particularly if we think about
inherent value as having a meaning more like “ultimate” value). This is why even if only the harm of
death is normally worse for humans than animals, it creates a deeply inegalitarian view. If there are
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more foreclosed opportunities for humans, it only shows that their loss of intrinsic value would be
greater, not their inherent value. Though Regan insists that making the decision this way does not
interfere with recognizing the dog's equal inherent value, Edwards argues that it does, since their equal
inherent worths are treated as if they cancel out one another, and thus inherent worth is then ignored in
the decision, resulting in the humans having a stronger right to life and a stronger right to freedom from
harm.352 Edwards believes that if we are really choosing among equals, that a lottery such as drawing
straws is the appropriate moral strategy; by Regan rejecting the idea of a lottery, he is ignoring his
doctrine of equality of inherent worth in favor of considering only unequal intrinsic worth and once this
happens, individuals are reduced to receptacles whose intrinsic values are what matter.353 This is exactly
what Regan claimed was wrong about utilitarianism and why he established the idea of inherent worth
of individuals in the first place.

4.3.2 Why We Should Reject Regan's Solution to the Lifeboat Case
To avoid the inconsistency between subjects-of-a-life having equal inherent value and the
resolution of the lifeboat case, two possibilities would be to give up the idea of the equality of inherent
value, or to reject Regan's conclusions about who ought to be sacrificed. Edwards argues for the former;
he thinks that Regan abandons his principles in the lifeboat case, but argues that this is what he ought to
do.354 He believes that Regan's error lies in his view of subjects-of-a-life all having equal inherent value
and that Regan should admit that animals do not have equal inherent value.355 He believes that we are
justified in sacrificing the dog both in terms of intrinsic value and inherent value; he believes that the
dog does not have an equal right to life.356 This would obviously be unacceptable to Regan though, as it
would exclude the possibility of an egalitarian theory of animal rights. The idea of individuals having
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equal fundamental value is not unique to Regan; it is generally accepted as an essential part of human
rights theories. I think it is important that if rights for animals are to be taken seriously, that basic rights
are equivalent for all rights bearers. Instead of abandoning the idea of equal inherent value, we should
reject Regan's conclusions about who ought to be sacrificed in the lifeboat case.
When a conflict arises between equal rights in a deontological theory, it becomes tempting to
revert to other types of reasoning: utilitarian, perfectionist or some other type of consequentialist
reasoning may take over, and this is what appears to happen in Regan's theory. Regan's reasoning about
the harm of death, in combination with the worse-off principle, seems like perfectionist consequentialist
reasoning. But if rights are not absolute in a moral theory, they ought to be at least very strong
constraints, not simply a factor that can be canceled out. Basic rights are especially important, since they
originate from the necessity of respecting those with inherent value. There are those who would argue,
like Regan, that the proper way to make decisions when faced with conflicts between rights holders is to
allow intrinsic values to be the determining factors – after all, would it not be better to use some
information rather than none? Finsen reflects this view:
When deciding whether to warn someone that a boulder is going to land on their head, it is not
relevant whether that person is there of their own volition, or there under coercion. Similarly, it
does not matter whether they will live another day or another fifty years. But these sorts of
factors do become relevant when we must choose between saving two individuals.357
The problem with this is that if we create a principled way of choosing between individuals based on
factors that ought to be irrelevant, it is unfair to the individual who ends up being harmed. Stephen
Sapontzis claims that in exceptional situations, we have to accept that the principles we use will be
different than those we use normally:
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We cannot infer from the principles used when we are forced to choose the lesser of two evils to
the principles of moral status in force when such a hard choice is not required. Such emergency
principles are invoked not as extensions of common moral principles but as auxiliaries needed
because those common principles do not provide satisfactory guidance in these uncommon
situations.358
Regan agrees about the exceptional nature of these cases, arguing that his reasoning in the lifeboat case
does not commit him to a perfectionistic theory of justice since these theories “sanction the routine
subordination of the less virtuous by those who are more virtuous” and that this is merely an exceptional
case, and not something that we can generalize to unexceptional cases.359 But Francione argues that
“even if the lifeboat example is the only or the primary example of the 'exceptional' case, it still
represents a form of perfectionism” and that “to say that this virtue may be appealed to only in
exceptional cases is nevertheless to say that in that class of cases, there is routine subordination based on
a supposed virtue possessed by one class of rightsholders.”360 Francione points out that although the the
lifeboat case is intended to be an exceptional circumstance, the miniride and worse-off principles are to
be used more generally to resolve conflicts, and “in morality, conflict is the rule and not the
exception.”361 We are forced to resort to a different type of reasoning (rather than simply appealing to
rights) any time rights conflict, not only in exceptional, rare circumstances. Intra-rights conflicts seem to
be the most difficult type to resolve, but these may not be all that rare, and even if turns out that they are
rare exceptions, we should not resort to using principles that are unfair and incompatible with an
egalitarian rights view.
The equality of inherent value is supposed to incorporate the idea that individuals' differences are
morally irrelevant to their status as an individual whose value merits respect. We should not allow these
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irrelevant factors to become relevant and inform our moral decisions at any point, even in difficult
conflicts, because doing so undermines the special value of subjects-of-a-life. Allowing this would
imply that it is who someone is as an individual that makes sacrificing them acceptable, or even the
obligatory thing to do. We cannot take the basic rights of individuals with inherent value seriously while
accepting this type of reasoning. Attempts to show that this reasoning is unacceptable for only certain
subjects-of-a-life will be ad hoc or discriminatory. Any principle that tells us who to sacrifice based on
the varying qualities of individuals is unacceptable. Principles for resolving conflicts, even the most
difficult ones, must be egalitarian.

4.4.1

Introduction to the Moral Dilemmas Debate
If, as I have argued, it is unfair to allow intrinsic values to determine who ought to be sacrificed

in the lifeboat case, then how should we think about the situation and how can it be resolved? Each
individual has an equal claim to not be sacrificed and we lack any further information to determine a
right choice. This intra rights conflict is an apparent deadlock.
Daniel Shapiro gives three different ways of describing apparent (inter- or intra-) rights conflicts:
(1) Proper description of the scope of rights reveals that only one party has a right in the situation
and therefore rights cannot conflict and are never overridden;
(2) Conflicts are possible because both parties have rights, but one overrides the other, and we
ought to compensate the one who has had their right overridden;
(3) Both parties have rights which may not be overridden and this results in a rights dilemma.362
Both (1) and (3) could allow for the possibility of absolute rights. In the specificationist view of rights,
most conflicts would be of type (1) because in this view, rights are absolute, but general rights do not
exist. Most conflicts in prima facie views, including Regan's, would fall under (2). Description (3)
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produces deadlocks and provides no additional way of furthering our ability to resolve conflicts. Regan
does not discuss the issue of (3) (moral rights dilemmas) in The Case for Animal Rights, but his theory
seems to exclude their possibility by offering a principled way to resolve every type of rights conflict.
For Regan, the lifeboat case is no dilemma – the dog's right may be justifiably infringed. But given my
argument that we may not rely on an individual's qualities to resolve conflicts, it seems like the lifeboat
case is an example of (3).
Shapiro notes that one of the problems associated with the view that rights dilemmas occur is
that we can either use nonrights principles to help break a dilemma, or we cannot, and that it seems most
useful to use nonrights principles, because we would otherwise be stuck with a dilemma we cannot
break.363 But, “rights are supposed peacefully to resolve deadlocks that result from people relying on
nonrights principles” Shapiro claims, and “here the opposite occurs – rights cause a deadlock which is
only resolved by nonrights principles.”364 We should not let this difficulty influence the decision of
whether to use nonrights principles or not; if it is unfair to use a particular nonrights principle to resolve
internal rights conflicts, then we should not use it. If we grant that Regan's worse-off and miniride
principles are acceptable ways of resolving conflicts, then we are left with the problem of intrarights
conflicts of equal numbers such as the lifeboat case. In these situations, Regan's solution is for us to go
back to using perfectionist reasoning to decide who would be harmed less, but since I have argued that
doing this violates the inherent value of individuals, we are left with an apparent dilemma.
Incorporating genuine dilemmas into ethical theories is controversial, and an unresolved debate
in moral philosophy: there are those who think that ethical theories must make room for them and others
who think that they must be avoided. Some think that the existence of a dilemma implies that the
principles of a moral system are inconsistent. Kant believed that his single- principled moral system
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would never lead to conflicts of duty.365 Regardless of whether or not we accept the possibility of
dilemmas, we must acknowledge that if inherent value is taken seriously, that at least intra-rights
conflicts will produce some situations where we have no principled way to make one action obligatory
over the other. This has the appearance of a genuine moral dilemma. In the lifeboat example, each
option will result in an equally bad outcome: any individual sacrificed will result in equal loss of
inherent value. There is no other morally relevant information available to inform our choice in the
scenario. Classifying this as a dilemma, however, depends on the exact definition of one, and also on
whether they are even possible.
Proponents of dilemmas tend to appeal to moral experience, citing examples of apparent
dilemmas (such as Sophie's Choice, where a woman is forced to choose between her two children to
save one from being sent to the gas chambers). If subjects-of-a-life are equally inherently valuable, than
Regan's lifeboat scenario would be another example similar to Sophie's choice. Opponents of dilemmas
may deny that they exist because they believe that apparent dilemmas will always dissolve upon close
examination of the details, but they tend to oppose dilemmas more for reasons of principle.366 Their
arguments tend to based on desirable features of moral systems in order to be rationally acceptable, and
they usually appeal to arguments from deontic logic.
4.4.2 Introduction to Standard Deontic Logic Arguments Against the Possibility of Dilemmas
Deontic logic is a type of logic that deals with the normative concepts of obligation, permission
and prohibition.367 In deontic logic, these are considered to be related to each other in the same way that
the standard alethic modalities (necessity, possibility and impossibility) of modal logic are.368 Instead of
the usual modal operators of □ to represent necessity and and ◊ to represent possibility, the deontic
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operators O and P are used analogously to represent Obligation and Permissibility.369 Deontic logic is a
type of non-reflexive logic; in reflexive logics, if something is necessary, then it is true in all possible
worlds (□p→p), but this is not the case in deontic logic since “we cannot assume that just because
something is obligatory it will be true.”370 So in deontic logic, we cannot say that (Op→p) is a logical
truth. Standard deontic logic is a normal propositional modal logic.371 It is a KD type of logic “which
means that it extends the propositional tautologies with the axioms K : O(x → y) → (Ox → Oy) and D :
¬(Ox ^ O¬x), and it is closed under the inference rules modus ponens x, x → y/y and Necessitation
x/Ox.”372
An example of a basic definition of a genuine dilemma is usually something like this: “Situations
in which, through no fault of a person's own, he or she is morally required to do one thing, required to
do another but cannot do both.”373 This is represented in standard deontic logic as: O (A), O (B) and ¬ ◊
(A ^ B).374 The most well-known, but controversial argument from deontic logic against the possibility
of moral dilemmas makes use of two principles: the agglomeration principle and the 'ought implies can'
principle. The agglomeration principle claims that if A ought to be done and B ought to be done, then A
and B both ought to be done: (O (A) ^ O (B)) → O (A ^ B).375 In modal logic, if it is necessary that p
and necessary that q, it is necessary that p and q. Since the obligation operator in deontic logic is
analogous to the necessity operator of modal logic, the agglomeration principle follows. The 'ought
implies can' principle, expresses that if we ought to do something, then it should be possible for us to do
so; in other words, impossible obligations are excluded: O (A) → ◊ (A).376 This was a principle of Kant's
and is widely accepted.377
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Argument 1 against the possibility of dilemmas:
(1) O (A) A ought to be done
(2) O (B) B ought to be done
(3) ¬ ◊ (A ^ B) It is not possible to do both A and B.
(4) (O (A) ^ O (B)) → O (A ^ B) (agglomeration principle).
(5) O (A ^ B) (1, 2, 4)
(6) O (A ^ B) → ◊ (A ^ B) ('ought' implies 'can' principle)
(7) ◊ (A ^ B)

(5, 6)

(8) ◊ (A ^ B) ^ ¬ ◊ (A ^ B) (3, 7 – contradiction). 378
It seems clear that if dilemmas are situations where we are obliged to do both of two actions, and
if ought implies that we can do both, that a contradiction arises if we cannot, in fact, do both. Possible
ways to avoid a logical contradiction while maintaining the possibility of dilemmas include doing away
with, or reinterpreting the agglomeration principle and/or the 'ought implies can' principle, redefining
what it means to have a genuine moral dilemma, or reconsidering the acceptability of standard deontic
logic to represent dilemmas.
It is important that we have a clear definition of a genuine moral dilemma in order to decide if
the lifeboat case is one, but also in order to make justified arguments for or against the existence of
dilemmas in general. Alan Donagan explains that “although no philosopher takes them to be merely
situations in which it is hard to say what is morally required, not all take them to be the same things.”379
In discussions of dilemmas, the following terms have identical meanings and may be used
interchangeably: obliged, required, and ought – and these may all be used to represent the concept of a
duty. It is important to understand that in standard deontic logic, since obligation is used analogously to
the necessity operator of modal logic, it implies an absolute obligation. We should not confuse this sense
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of ought with its broader common usage. For example, we often make statements such as 'you ought to
be on time for your appointments', but it is understood that this is not an absolute, all-things-considered
ought. We also might make statements such as 'you ought to tidy your house', but this is not associated
with a moral obligation. So we often use ought to describe our prima facie obligations, and even as a
way of expressing suggestions about nonmoral desirable outcomes, but in standard deontic logic, the use
of the term is restricted to absolute oughts. This should make us wonder how we can use standard
deontic logic to represent a conflict from a moral system like Regan's – one of prima facie rights and
duties. The lifeboat example appears to be dilemmatic, but we have only equally strong prima facie
obligations to the individuals involved.
Hansen claims that there are two views of normative conflicts: one where they do not exist, and
the other where they are ubiquitous380. By conflicts, he is referring to conflicts between both equally and
unequally strong norms. Nozick's theory of rights as negative side-constraints is one that is meant to
avoid conflicts entirely. Kant also believed that his theory precluded any possible conflicts of duty.
Specificationist views also do not allow for conflicts, since apparent conflicts always dissolve upon
examining the details of a situation. In views where conflicts are ubiquitous, logic about norms would
have to take possible conflicts into account, but Hansen notes that it is unclear how standard deontic
logic could accommodate this.381 If genuine dilemmas must involve conflicting absolute duties, then it
would be necessary to determine which duties should be considered absolute ones that could be
represented by standard deontic logic. In a strongly deontological moral system where all rights were
absolute, then conflicts of absolute obligations would be frequent. Regan's view incorporates the idea of
ubiquitous conflicts, but between prima facie duties, so it is not clear how they can be represented. We
might think that for moral systems with prima facie duties, it could be possible that there are a few rights
associated with an absolute obligation that could give rise to a genuine dilemma. But for Regan, even
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our most basic rights are merely prima facie ones, so none of them would fit clearly into the deontic
logic arguments; yet, we are still left with a situation where equally strong claims are at stake, resulting
in an apparent genuine dilemma.
Definitions of genuine moral dilemmas vary in terms of whether they must involve absolute
obligations or not. For example, Terrance McConnell states that “it is obvious that if there are genuine
moral dilemmas, then the 'oughts' that conflict must be strict or absolute ones, and not merely prima
facie ones.”382 Earl Conee also claims that if we accept genuine dilemmas, we must accept that “actions
are possible that are both absolutely, unconditionally, and not merely prima facie morally obligatory,
and absolutely unconditionally, and not merely prima facie morally impermissible.”383 Conversely, some
definitions of genuine dilemmas incorporate the idea of prima facie oughts. According to Jacquette, a
moral dilemma is “where circumstances prevent two or more equally justified prima facie ethical
requirements from being fulfilled.”384 It seems that there is no consensus on the issue of whether prima
facie requirements are capable of generating genuine moral dilemmas or not. This lack of consistency
between definitions is problematic since those debating for or against the existence of genuine dilemmas
may be arguing for different things.
If the obligations in dilemmas must be absolute, then part of the description of dilemmas often
involves the unavoidable outcome that something wrong will occur regardless of the action taken by the
agent. Before discussing this claim, we should be clear about the use of the word 'wrong' in our
discussions of dilemmas. Mark Timmons describes the standard categories of deontic evaluation as
being used to determine the morality (or the rightness and wrongness) of actions.385 There are three
basic categories: obligatory actions (otherwise known as duties or “required” or “right”), wrong actions
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(or “forbidden”, “impermissible”, “contrary to duty”), and optional actions (something permissible but
neither obligatory nor wrong).386 He explains that “right” may be used in a broad sense (referring to
anything not wrong – including both obligatory and optional actions) or a narrow sense (referring only
to obligatory actions).387 Two important things that we should note from this characterization of deontic
categories are a) the lack of a “right” action does not necessarily imply that we are forced to do
something wrong, there is the possibility of an optional action; and b) it is impossible to have an action
that is both permissible and wrong.
De Haan's account of dilemmas incorporates the idea of inevitable wrongdoing. He argues that
the correct definition must capture the fact that dilemmas are genuinely dilemmatic, which to him means
that “the agent cannot avoid doing something wrong.”388 He points out that if an agent has reason to do
A and reason to do B and cannot do both, B can be defeated by A if the reason to do A is stronger. In
this case, only A ought to be done. He notes that some may consider wrongdoing to be done by not
doing B in this case, but that this is not the most significant sense of wrongdoing.389 It makes sense that
if A ought to be done (it was obligatory), then it is irrational to say that something wrong was done by
not doing B, since according to Timmons' explanation, it is impossible for an action to be both right and
wrong. De Haan explains that is more likely that wrongdoing will occur either way if the reason to do A
is not stronger than the reason to do B and vice versa.390 This could occur either because A and B are
equally strong, or because they are incommensurable.391 But claiming that an agent inevitably does
something wrong may nevertheless be problematic. Hansen explains that views where conflicts of norms
do not exist tend to appeal to the absurdity of saying that we have conflicting obligations: “to state a
norm that cannot be fulfilled is a meaningless use of the language....To say that a subject has two
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conflicting obligations is therefore a misuse of the term 'obligation'.”392 He explains that “the problem
that arises for such a view is then how to determine the ‘actual obligations’ in face of apparent conflicts,
or, put differently, in the face of conflicting ‘prima facie’ obligations.”393 A possible way of
accomplishing this it through a method of ordering norms in terms of their importance, but based on our
moral experiences, it seems that there are some situations in which norms are incomparable or of equal
weight, and so this method runs into difficulty in these cases.394
There does not seem to be consensus on whether or not dilemmas may involve merely prima
facie duties, nor does there seem to be consensus on whether deontic logic is compatible with the
existence of dilemmas. Many believe that the standard deontic logic argument shows that moral systems
allowing for dilemmas are impossible, but Ragnar Ohlsson believes that the arguments have not been
successful in showing that the existence of dilemmas is logically inconsistent.395 He claims that all
attempts to show this “build on the supposition that some principles of deontic logic are valid” but that
these are all controversial and are often rejected by proponents of dilemmas: “these principles, they say,
are formulated in order to rule dilemmas out. No conclusive argument therefore can be constructed in
terms of them – it would be to beg the question.”396 Indeed, some proponents of moral dilemmas have
dispensed with, or reinterpreted the agglomeration principle or the 'ought implies can' principle,
allowing for dilemmas to be compatible with deontic logic.397 John Horty, on the other hand, thinks that
they are clearly incompatible. He claims that although we have clear examples of dilemmas in
philosophy and literature, that the rules of standard deontic logic eliminate their possibility, since, he
claims, the assumption that they are impossible is built into standard deontic logic.398 Since OA is true
“whenever A is a necessary condition for things turning out as they ought”, then “if OA is true at a
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situation, so that A is true at all of its deontic alternatives, then ¬A cannot be true at any of them.”399 In
other words, OA and O¬A cannot both be true, and so there is no possible situation that could have
conflicting oughts.400 Though it is an unresolved debate whether ethical theories ought to avoid the
possibility of dilemmas or not, Horty thinks that ruling them out may be an objectionable feature of
standard deontic logic and that we ought not build a position on the issue into the logic of the subject.401
He believes that it is worthwhile to have a logic that allows for conflicting oughts even if it turns out that
the correct moral system does not, since our everyday moral reasoning involves conflicting oughts.402
Basing his work on van Fraassen, who argues that “the problem of possibly irresolvable moral conflict
reveals serious flaws in the philosophical and semantic foundations of 'orthodox' deontic logic”, Horty
suggests using alternatives to standard deontic logic to represent moral obligations.403 He proposes the
use of nonmonotonic logic as an alternative to the ordinary modal framework.404 Nonmonotonic logic is
meant to represent the idea of defeasible reasoning, and so, could possibly represent conditional or
prima facie 'oughts'.
In the next section, I discuss the views of David Brink, who offers what I believe to be a good
account of apparently dilemmatic situations. His account is useful because it offers a clear explanation
of the connection between prima facie obligations and the absolute obligations used in standard deontic
logic. It also involves standard deontic logic arguments that are less controversial than Argument 1. His
solution involves denying the existence of dilemmas, yet it remains in line with our intuitions about our
moral experiences.
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4.5.1 Brink's Characterization of Prima Facie and All-Things-Considered Obligations
David Brink offers a way to explain how a moral system comprised entirely of prima facie duties
can give rise to obligations that can be described in standard deontic logic. He notes that “it is a conflict
of all-things considered, and not merely prima facie, duties that is required to generate a moral conflict
that would have serious implications for ethical theory.”405 He explains that prima facie duties that are
not outweighed by other considerations give rise to duties that we must absolutely fulfill; these duties
are “all-things-considered obligations”.406 An all-things considered obligation is not exactly the same as
an absolute duty because the latter exists independent of context, while the former exists only in certain
contexts. Nevertheless, all-things-considered obligations may be represented equivalently to absolute
obligations in standard deontic logic because once we have determined something is all-thingsconsidered obligatory, we must act according to that duty absolutely. Brink's explanation is based on
W.D. Ross' account of prima facie duties and their distinction from sans phrase obligations.407 An allthings-considered obligation is an undefeated prima facie obligation: “an all-things-considered moral
obligation to do x means that on balance, or in view of all morally relevant factors, x is what one ought
to do or that x is supported by the strongest moral reasons.”408 And x is prima facie obligatory resulting
form x's possessing some morally relevant factor F. He treats prima facie obligations as “moral factors
or forces that interact so as to determine all-things-considered obligations.”409 Ceteris paribus, F-ness
makes actions all-things-considered obligatory.410 All else will be equal only if F is undefeated, and it
will be undefeated if:
(a) there are no competing moral factors,
(b) there are competing factors that cancel each other out, or

405
406
407
408
409
410

David Brink, “Moral Conflict and Its Structure,” The Philosophical Review 103, no. 2 (1994): 216.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 217.
Ibid.

88

(c) competing factors not canceled out do not override F's support for x.411
So according to Brink's model, “prima facie obligations are conditional (all-things-considered) duties in
the sense that if all else is equal, then there is not only a prima facie obligation to do x but also a genuine
or all-things-considered obligation.”412 He suggests that the way we determine all-things-considered
obligations is to do “moral factor addition” where we add positive and negative moral forces in a certain
scenario.413 Regan's method of determining all-things-considered obligations is through the use of his
principles for overriding rights. The lifeboat case, however, has equally strong competing moral forces.
Brink notes that it is sometimes thought that only all-things-considered obligations are genuine
obligations and that prima facie ones are only apparent – he thinks that this tendency may be reinforced
by the use of O in standard deontic logic to represent an all-things-considered obligation.414 He argues
that this is a misunderstanding of prima facie obligations though, and explains that we should not
understand them as an epistemic claim that certain things appear to be obligatory that may prove not to
be, but rather we should give them a metaphysical reading that recognizes them as moral forces that are
not canceled by the existence of other moral forces, even if others override or defeat them.415

4.5.2 Brink's Recipe for Dilemmas
In a genuine moral dilemma, competing moral claims must be equally strong (“equipollent”),
and not merely in an epistemic sense that they seem equally compelling (this would give only an
epistemic dilemma).416 Instead, they must involve “metaphysical equipollence” where the competing
claims are actually equally strong.417 So for prima facie obligations to give rise to a genuine dilemma,
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they must be insoluble conflicts.418 It is sometimes thought that even if one prima facie duty is
overridden by a stronger competitor that there is still a dilemma because we have failed to do a duty that
is grounds for “compunction or regret” for the agent, and that this should not simply disappear.419 Brink
argues that we can still explain regret for failing to perform a defeated prima facie obligation if we think
of prima facie obligations as moral forces that are still at work even when they are overridden.420 This
seems to fit our intuitions about tough choices between prima facie duties; failing to perform a prima
facie duty may seem regrettable, even if doing so allowed us to choose the morally best option.
Brink gives a 'recipe' for genuine moral dilemmas with the condition that they must involve
competing ATC obligations and not merely competing prima facie duties:
1. One has a prima facie obligation to do A.
2. One has a prima facie obligation to do B.
3. One is under an all-things-considered obligation to do x just in case one is under a prima facie
obligation to do x, and there is no greater, simple or complex, competing prima facie obligation one is
under.
4. One's prima facie obligation to do A is no greater than one's prima facie obligation to do B, and vice
versa.
5. One is under no other prima facie obligation, simple or complex, that competes with A or B and that
is as great an obligation.
6. Hence one has an all-things-considered obligation to do A. [1,3-5]
7. Hence one has an all-things-considered obligation to do B. [2-5]
8. It is possible for one to do A.
9. It is possible for one to do B.
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10. It is not possible for one to do A and B.

421

Brink then uses this recipe to show paradoxes that result from accepting it.

4.6 More Arguments against the Possibility of Dilemmas
Based on the characterization of a dilemma Brink constructed, he gives two arguments in
addition to the first deontic logic argument. He believes that these are less controversial than the first
argument because they are based on principles he thinks are easier to accept. He discusses a principle
that he thinks should be uncontroversial: O(¬B) ≡ ¬P(B).422 He calls this the correlativity principle
because it expresses a correlativity between obligatoriness and permissibility: “if not-B is obligatory,
then B is impermissible, and vice versa.”423 Given that we are representing all-things-considered
obligations, this principle does appear to be correct – if it is obligatory to not do something, then it is
impermissible to do it. Recalling Timmons' deontic categories, an action cannot be both forbidden
(wrong) and permissible. Rod Girle states that the O and P operators of deontic logic are “inter-defined
by the obvious equivalence: (Op ≡ ¬P¬p).”424 The correlativity principle is another way of stating this
equivalence. This can clearly be seen by substituting (¬B) for p in the defining equivalence from Girle:
Op ≡ ¬P¬p
O(¬B) ≡ ¬P¬(¬B)
O(¬B) ≡ ¬P(B)
And so, the correlativity principle is indeed uncontroversial.
The first of Brink's arguments uses a principle called the obligation execution principle: (O (A) ^
(B → ¬ A)) → O (¬ B). This principle means that “if you're (all-things-considered) obligated to do A,
and B would prevent A or bring about not-A, then you're obligated not to do B. ).”425 It also uses a
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principle that is weaker than the correlativity principle, and for this reason, it is termed the “weak
obligation principle”: O (¬ B) → ¬ O (B).426 This says that “if it is obligatory to do not-B, then it is not
obligatory to do B.”427 This certainly seems weaker than the correlativity principle – according to this
principle if we are obligated to not do something then it is not obligatory to do it. So in terms of
Timmons' categories, this is like saying that something cannot be both forbidden and required, and this
is a more obvious claim that saying that something cannot be both forbidden and optional (as the
correlativity principle states).
Argument 2 against the possibility of dilemmas:
(1) O (A)
(2) O (B)
(3) ¬ ◊ (A ^ B)
(4) B → ¬ A
(5) (O (A) ^ (B → ¬ A)) → O (¬ B) [obligation execution principle]
(6) O (¬ B)

[1, 4, 5]

(7) O (¬ B) → ¬ O (B) [weak obligation principle]
(8) Hence, ¬ O (B) [6, 7]
(9) O (B) ^ ¬ O (B) [2, 8]. 428
Since this contradiction resulted from using principles that are more easily acceptable than the
agglomeration and 'ought implies can' principles, this seems to give stronger support to the argument
that dilemmas do not exist.
The next argument makes use of the obligation execution principle, as it shares the first six
premises as Argument 2. It also uses the correlativity principle and a new principle called the weak
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impermissibility principle: ¬ P (B) → ¬ O (B).429 This principle says that “if B is impermissible then it
is not the case that B is obligatory.”430 It is easy to see that this principle is acceptable if we recall that
according to the deontic categories, impermissible actions are wrong ones, they are not permissible or
obligatory.
Argument 3 against the possibility of dilemmas:
(1) O (A)
(2) O (B)
(3) ¬ ◊ (A ^ B)
(4) B → ¬ A
(5) (O (A) ^ (B → ¬ A)) → O (¬ B) [obligation execution principle]
(6) O (¬ B)

[1, 4, 5]

(7) O (¬ B) ↔ ¬ P (B) [correlativity]
(8) ¬ P (B)

[6, 7]

(9) ¬ P (B) → ¬ O (B) [weak impermissibility principle]
(10) Hence, ¬ O (B) (10)

[8, 9]

(11) Hence, O (B) ^ ¬ O (B) [2, 10]. 431
Jurriaan De Haan believes that Brink's arguments are helpful because they explain the connection
between competing obligations in a conflict.432 Arguments 2 and 3 are accomplished with principles that
are less contentious than those in Argument 1, so they provide stronger evidence against the possibility
of dilemmas. Because these paradoxes were generated from the supposition that there are moral
dilemmas (conflicts of all-things-considered obligations), we must either reject moral dilemmas or some
of the deontic principles. Brink thinks that the agglomeration principle, and possibly the ought implies
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can principle from the first argument may be given up at a reasonable cost but that these other two
paradoxes rest on more secure principles that are fundamental to our moral reasoning.433 Since he is
confident that the principles are correct, he believes that we ought to reject the idea of genuine moral
dilemmas. He thinks that the correct thing to give up is the idea of undefeated prima facie obligations
always yielding all-things-considered obligations.434 Even though it may be true most of the time that
undefeated prima facie obligations yield all-things-considered obligations, they do not if there is an
undefeated competitor; in this case, neither becomes an all-things-considered obligation.435

4.7 Solution to the Moral Dilemmas Problem
Instead of having two all-things-considered obligations in situations where conflicting prima
facie obligations are undefeated, Brink claims that there are none. Instead, the agent is faced with an allthings-considered disjunctive obligation to perform one of the conflicting prima facie obligations.436
These are the claims that appear to be true about conflicts between undefeated prima facie obligations
according to Brink. He uses a lowercase 'o' to represent prima facie obligations:
o (A)
o (B)
¬ (o (A) > o (B))
¬ (o(B) > o(A))
O(A v B)
¬ O(A)
¬ O(B)
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These claims do seem to be a better way of describing our intuitions about our obligations in an
apparently dilemmatic situation. We are not left with the nonsensical outcome of being all-thingsconsidered obliged to do both of two things that we cannot do. Donagan also has a similar view:
“certainly there is no moral conflict: from the fact that I have a duty to save either a or b, it does not
follow that I have a duty to save a and a duty to save b.”438 If these claims are true, in insoluble conflicts,
the disjunctive obligation is the only all-things-considered obligation and the agent may do either option,
but the agent does something impermissible if she performs neither disjunct.439 The agent may leave a
strong (undefeated) prima facie obligation unperformed, which Brink claims may be cause for regret on
behalf of the agent for not responding to some moral force.440 Brink concludes that we ought to deny the
possibility of moral dilemmas and that the problematic aspect of the recipe is step 3 which says that an
all-things-considered obligation is simply an undefeated prima facie obligation.441 Instead, all-thingsconsidered obligations should be thought of as prima facie obligations that are undefeated and defeat all
competitors; a prima facie obligation must be overriding and not simply not overridden.442 If we accept
this, in the lifeboat case, since all the moral forces are equal, none of them defeat the competitors – none
are overriding. We have no all-things-considered obligation to rescue any particular individual.
Sophie's Choice is one of the most famous examples of a moral dilemma. According to Brink's
solution, Sophie would have a disjunctive obligation to save one of her two children, and so saving
either of them would be permissible. Suzanne Dovi has an alternative account of the situation. Like
Brink, she believes that saving either of the children is permissible, and she thinks that the use of chance
is the preferable way to resolve moral dilemmas; however, Dovi allows for the existence of genuine
dilemmas.443 She describes genuine moral dilemmas as occurring in either situations with equally
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weighted options or with incommensurable ones.444 Not only does she think that it is permissible for
Sophie to choose one of her children, she also thinks that the option of choosing neither is permissible:
“Sophie is not subject to any moral requirements, either to choose or not to choose, because there is no
right answer to the question 'what ought Sophie to do morally?'”445 This is different than the disjunctive
ought resolution of apparent dilemmatic situations. In terms of the lifeboat case, this would be the option
of not pushing anyone overboard and letting everyone in the lifeboat drown. But if we think about prima
facie obligations as moral forces in the metaphysical sense that Brink suggests, it seems hard to imagine
that having two equal forces should simply cancel each other out so that we have no obligation at all.
Donagan claims that in situations involving a conflict between saving the lives of identical twins, “every
serious rationalist moral system lays down that whatever I do, I must save one of them.”446
According to Brink, in cases where one duty is stronger than another, the weaker may be
justifiably overridden and in situations where the duties are equally strong, either option is permissible;
these conclusions allow him to deny the existence of dilemmas. But despite allowing for more
permissible options for the agent than Brink's solution does, Dovi maintains that the situation is a
genuine dilemma and that the agent is forced to do something wrong: “since whatever she does, she does
something morally wrong, Sophie is not morally required to choose between her children or to refuse to
choose between her children.”447 She explains that using chance is “morally permissible, and even
morally preferable”448 but that there is a distinction between moral preferability and moral obligation
and that “choosing chance does not erase the fact that Sophie still faces a genuine moral dilemma and
thereby cannot avoid violating important moral obligations.”449 So Dovi seems to make a distinction
between permissibility, preferability and obligatoriness. The strength of preferability appears to be
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between permissibility and obligatoriness. But this additional category does not help alleviate the
meaninglessness of making the claims that Sophie is both forced to do something wrong, and that any
available option is permissible. Certainly if we accept Timmons' deontic categories, these two claims are
incompatible. The addition of 'preferability' does not help, since permissibility would be closer to being
compatible with prohibition than preferability would; if an action cannot be both permissible and
prohibited, then certainly it could not be both a preferable and prohibited action. And so, I think that it
does not make sense to say that Sophie is both acting in a permissible/preferable way by using chance to
decide between her children, and that she is forced to do something wrong.
I think that the problem lies in an ambiguous use of the word “wrong”. In terms of dilemmas,
the word wrong has a specific normative connotation – it implies that an action is impermissible,
prohibited, or blameworthy. However, the word wrong is also commonly used to describe tragic
consequences. Since the typical examples of dilemmas usually involve tragic choices with terrible
outcomes, it is tempting to say that something wrong will occur with either choice, when what we mean
is that something very bad will happen either way. We need to recognize the distinction between the
common use of the word wrong and the more limited sense used in discussions of dilemmas.
Wrongdoing in ethics is associated with blameworthiness, and it seems nonsensical to hold an agent
responsible for a terrible outcome that was unavoidable.
In any sort of moral conflict we are forced to do something that is not ideal, and this produces an
outcome with some sort of bad consequence since we fail to act on a moral force. Even in a situation
with clearly unequal moral forces, we always perform an action that results in some bad consequence.
However, in these situations it is it is less temping to say that the agent has done something wrong (even
though they have done something with bad consequences) since the bad consequences were less bad
than the alternative. It is also worth noting that apparently dilemmatic situations do not have to involve
tragic circumstances. Apparent dilemmas are just those situations where the competing moral forces are
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equipollent; if the moral forces in a conflict were only minor harms, I think that we would be less
inclined to have an intuition that the agent has done something wrong or is blameworthy either way.
Brink discusses the possible objections that his solution treats these conflicts as no-lose
situations rather than no-win situations, and that this seems to take the conflict out of moral conflict, but
he points out that since whatever the agent does, she will fail to perform a strong, undefeated prima facie
obligation, that this can be an appropriate object of “compunction or regret.”450 Donagan argues that
when conflicts are symmetrical, “there are no grounds, moral or nonmoral, for saving either as opposed
to the other.”451 He believes that Kant and most rationalists would argue that in identical twin examples,
if the moral considerations are symmetrical, the question of which child to save is not a moral one at all.
Instead, it is a practical question and to consider it a moral question would be to falsely assume “that any
practical question about what to do in a situation in which morality places restrictions on what we may
do must be a moral question.”452 In apparently dilemmatic situations, there is no moral conflict, only
practical conflict – according to Donagan, the only rational answer to the practical question of who to
save is that “it does not matter.”453 He points out that many decisions concerning what we should do are
determined by practical, non moral considerations, but in situations where moral forces are in conflict
and they would otherwise give rise to a moral obligation, it is easy to mistake the conflict as a moral
one. We tend to assume that in any situation where moral considerations are relevant, that the answer to
what we should do is a moral one. Donagan uses an example of a fireman, pointing out that we would
not blame a fireman if he had to choose between saving some people from a burning building as long as
he saved as many as possible. It is a practical conflict that he cannot save all of them. Thus, Donagan is
in agreement with Brink that genuine moral dilemmas do not exist.
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Brink and Donagan's conclusions about the existence of genuine dilemmas are, I think, the most
plausible as they offer explanations that are coherent both in terms of deontic logic and our intuitions
about examples of moral experiences such as Sophie's choice. According to Brink's account, Sophie
would have an all-things-considered obligation to save one of her children but would likely be left with
feelings of regret, due to the moral forces not acted upon; however, she would be doing nothing morally
wrong. Even in conflicts with unequally strong moral forces, having a metaphysical understanding of
prima facie duties allows us to explain how a moral agent may feel guilt or remorse for not being able to
act upon a defeated obligation. It might be the case that the outcomes of practical conflicts ought to give
rise to certain moral attitudes. Brink claims that “perhaps a morally decent person should have moral
attitudes, such as compunction or regret, that track moral forces or factors.”454 However, expecting a
morally decent person to have these attitudes does not change the fact that overriding an obligation may
be permissible, or even the right thing to do.

4.8 Alternative Solution to the Lifeboat Problem
In the lifeboat problem, saving the dog is a permissible option. If we agree that inherent value
means something like ultimate value, it is impermissible to allow an individual’s qualities determine
what the 'harm of death' is for them. The dog has inherent value equal to that of the humans, and
therefore, we should regard the harm of death as being equal for all on the lifeboat. The situation is an
apparently dilemmatic one: the extinction of the inherent value of at least one subject-of-a-life will
inevitably occur, and since this value is equal for all individuals involved, it can only been seen as a
symmetrical choice. Based on the conclusions reached about dilemmas, this means that in the lifeboat,
the fact that we cannot save everyone is a practical problem, rather than a moral one. In such situations,
any option is permissible, as long as we save as many as possible, and so, saving the dog is a permissible
option. Any principle that would tell us we have an obligation to save certain individuals in the boat
454
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over others would be irrational and unfair as it would undermine the importance of basic rights which
stem from the equal inherent value of the rights-holders. It would therefore be wrong to make sacrificing
the dog (or any particular individual) obligatory.
Both Sophie's Choice and the lifeboat choice are tragic decisions, but we should not let the
badness of the outcomes influence us to blame the agent. In apparent moral dilemmas, by definition, the
agent has no control over not being able to act on all of the moral forces at work. It is also beyond the
agent's control whether the outcomes happen to be terrible or simply non-ideal. Any moral force not
acted on (whether resulting in a tragic outcome or not) may produce feelings of guilt or regret for the
agent. We might find that an agent lacks the appropriate moral attitudes if they do not have these
feelings of regret when tragic outcomes are at stake, but their decision in a symmetrical choice is never
blameworthy – actions cannot be both permissible and blameworthy.
One possible exception to the permissibility of choosing either option could be if the agent
decided to make a decision based on the wrong reasons. For example, if someone hated dogs, it might be
wrong to make the decision in this way. Dworkin thinks that in a lifeboat situation, the only fair way to
decide is by chance:
Suppose passengers are trapped in a lifeboat on the high seas that will sink unless one person—
any person—jumps or is thrown overboard. How shall the group decide who is to be sacrificed?
It seems perfectly fair to draw straws or in some other way let fate decide. That gives each
person the same chance of staying alive. Letting the group vote, however, seems a bad idea
because kinship, friendships, enmities, jealousies, and other forces that should not make a
difference will then be decisive.455
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Dovi also believes that allowing chance to decide is morally preferable, due to its distancing effect – it
allows the agent to avoid actively choosing between individuals, or possibly choosing for the wrong
reason.456 This distance, she believes, would also help reduce the guilt experienced by the agent.457
One of the most common criticisms of Regan's resolution of lifeboat case has been the supposed
implication that researching on animals would be acceptable. Though I think the disjunctive ought
solution is right one for apparently dilemmatic situations, attempts to characterize research as an
apparent dilemma between humans and animals fail. Along with Finsen and Regan, I agree that the
lifeboat case is not analogous to research and therefore we do not face such disjunctive oughts in
determining who to experiment on. Finsen claims that “the choice to sacrifice a human or another rightsbearing animal in such a situation is closer to 'Sophie's Choice' than it is to a lifeboat. That is, it is a
monstrous choice, requiring a sacrifice and creating a conflict where no such conflict need be
immanent.”458 When it comes to research, we are not forced to violate the rights of any individual: we
have the option of finding alternative types of research that do not violate anyone's rights, or stopping
the research altogether.
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Conclusion
In cases of apparent dilemmas, the prima facie moral forces are symmetrical, and there is no way
of deciding morally which option is right. It does not make sense to speak of agents making a moral
decision in this case, since neither option is right and neither option is wrong – anything they decide to
do is permissible. We are left with a practical conflict, rather than a moral one. In order to respect the
equal inherent value of each of the individuals on the lifeboat, we must view the situation as an apparent
dilemma, and thus the option to save any of them is permissible. Regan claims that inherent value,
which provides the foundation for basic rights, exists independently of an individual's varied capacities.
However, in apparent dilemmas, he believes that allowing individuals' qualities to play a role in our
decision making is not only acceptable, but in fact the preferred way to resolve these conflicts. This
treats inherent values of individuals as if they can be simply canceled out as moral factors; but the duties
associated with the basic rights of those with inherent value ought to be regarded as strong metaphysical
moral forces that do not simply disappear when they are in a symmetrical conflict. In order to respect the
basic rights of subjects-of-a-life, it is necessary to reject the idea that their qualities may play a role in
conflicts involving harm.
It should be recalled that I have not attempted to justify Regan's claims that animals have
inherent value and basic rights. My goal has been to discuss acceptable ways of resolving rights
conflicts involving animals given these assumptions. Even though the lifeboat is an exceptional case,
and Regan thought it was relatively unimportant to his theory overall, I think that his method of
resolution does have important consequences that are incompatible with his fundamental principles. An
alternative solution is necessary in order for his theory to remain consistent. My proposed alternative has
implications beyond the particular, exceptional case of the lifeboat. It would differ from Regan's view in
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terms of how we characterize certain classes of rights conflicts, how to resolve them, and how to
adequately respect rights holders.
There are many unresolved issues that would need to be sorted out before actually adopting my
suggestions. Of course, one would need to agree that animals do have rights, and this is controversial.
Another point that I have been assuming is the acceptability of moderate deontological rights views. I
have not made any attempt to resolve the debate on this issue, though it should be noted that this is a
commonly accepted position. I have discussed some of the strengths and criticisms of Regan's miniride
and worse-off principles, but I have not drawn any conclusions about their acceptability. This issue does
not affect my recommendations about the resolution of the lifeboat case. There is also the issue of how
we could know when we are faced with moral situations involving metaphysical equipollence as
opposed to merely epistemic equipollence. This is another problem I have set aside for now, but if it can
be determined that there are certain situations that qualify as having metaphysically equipollent moral
forces, then my conclusions would hold in these examples.
Before rights conflict, there is little controversy over how to respect those with inherent value; it
is at the more critical level of moral reasoning that we tend to disagree about how to accomplish this.
Kamm explains that if individuals have a value with high inviolability, then the rights expressing this
will specifically exclude certain factors as reasons for infringing the rights. For Regan, utilitarian
aggregation is one of these factors. Factors he does allow as good reasons for infringing rights are
numbers and magnitudes of harm, as well as his comparative harm analysis in the lifeboat case. Regan's
miniride and worse-off principles for dealing with rights conflicts may or may not be acceptable, but my
suggestions are neutral in this respect. According to my view, any principles for conflict resolution must
not rely on the characteristics of subjects-of-a-life and must be egalitarian. For the most part (aside from
Regan's harm of death analysis), his principles are in accordance with my recommendations, though we
may decide that they are unacceptable for other reasons (for example, Taurek argues that numbers ought
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to be excluded as a reason for infringing rights). The miniride principle says to minimize rights
violations, it does not matter who the individuals are, numbers are the important thing. Since this
principle does not make determinations based on the characteristics of individuals, it is not in opposition
to my view in this respect. Whether or not we agree that numbers are an egalitarian way of resolving
conflicts is a debate I will leave for others. The worse-off principle alone is also not at odds with my
suggestion since it weighs different harms, and the individual experiencing the harm is irrelevant to this
determination. It is only if we allow the same harm to count differently for different individuals that the
worse-off principle would go against my suggestion. Both of these principles may or may not be fair
ways of dealing with conflicts, and this is up for debate; but either way, they do not violate the feature of
rights that I am suggesting.
Another unresolved issue concerns our epistemic access to dilemmas. It might seem that we are
restricted from determining which cases actually involve metaphysical equipollence. Brink briefly
discusses this problem, stating that he thinks we must admit the possibility of insoluble conflicts, even
though we should be skeptical about their frequency.459 Apparent dilemmas may be between either
incommensurable moral reasons, or equally strong moral reasons. I have been dealing strictly with
examples involving equally strong ones. It indeed seems that it would be difficult to establish
metaphysical equipollence with certainty between incommensurable moral factors. This is a problem I
will leave aside though, since my suggestions do not deal with incommensurable moral factors.
Dilemmas between equal moral reasons, however, seem like they may be easier to establish with
certainty. Brink agrees that the existence of insoluble conflicts can be clearly demonstrated in cases
involving “symmetrical but conflicting duties.”460 One practical implication of my recommendation to
not allow individuals' qualities contribute to moral reasoning about who to harm in rights conflicts is
that it would make the task of determining when we are in an apparent dilemma simpler. It eliminates
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any characteristics of individuals as relevant moral factors that need to be weighed in the decision. So
any situation involving equal rights at stake between subjects-of-a-life would be an apparent dilemma.
Of course this would result in more genuine “dilemmas”. Some situations that might otherwise have
been resolvable through Regan's principles (situations where the same harm was determined to be
different for different individuals) will now be symmetrical decisions. According to my view, more
conflicts will be resolved through chance, instead of through the use of the worse-off principle. In cases
where the only difference is between the qualities of individuals, the worse-off principle would provide
a moral obligation to harm one over another. In my view it would be wrong to use the worse-off
principle in these situations since either option is permissible.
This method of resolution may apply to conflicts between humans, not only to conflicts between
animals and humans, and so, my suggestion is relevant to discussions of human rights as well. For
example, according to Regan's view, it would be obligatory to sacrifice an old person to save a younger
person, while in my view, it would be permissible to save either. Donagan discusses examples involving
the choice of saving one from a set of identical twins – this type of situation would certainly count as an
apparent dilemma. However, according to my view, almost any situation where we must choose
between infringing upon one of the equal rights of subjects-of-a-life would be an apparent dilemma, and
so the fact that they are identical twins would be irrelevant. My proposed solution differs from Regan's
in terms of what it means to respect those with inherent value. In apparent dilemmas, if we conclude that
the same rights infringement causes differing amounts of harm to subjects-of-a-life, it means that
individuals' qualities, even those they have no control over, become a basis for whether or not they will
be free from harm, and this does not respect their inherent value. The belief that an individual's qualities
become morally relevant factors in equal conflicts between rights holders is a somewhat commonly
accepted view. Finsen and Regan both adopt this view, and there is also the tradition that one ought to
save 'women and children first'. But the right to be free from harm is a basic right, and is supposed to be
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equal for all subjects-of-a-life. Basic rights are the strongest type of moral forces, and if we follow
Brink's suggestion that moral forces ought to be given a metaphysical reading, they cannot simply be
canceled out and ignored if they are equally strong and in conflict. These basic rights were established
based on inherent value, which is supposed to be equal regardless of individuals' capacities or qualities.
If we were to ignore the strong moral forces and resolve conflicts by concluding that harm is less for
some based on their qualities (age, species, intellectual abilities, etc.), then we would be claiming that
certain individuals have lesser value, and a less strong right to be free from harm. This is different than
factors such as differing harms or numbers, which are neutral with respect to the characteristics of the
individuals involved.
It might be objected that there are more extreme examples where the qualities of individuals
ought to play a role in determining who to sacrifice: for example, if someone was suffering and wanted
to be put out of their misery, surely they should be sacrificed before someone who is healthy. In such a
scenario however, if it were in the interest of an individual's welfare to be sacrificed, this would not be
violating their rights and so a rights conflict would not even exist. Regan discusses the issue of
euthanasia, arguing that it is acceptable in some situations where it is in the interest of the individual
(either moral agents or patients).461 If someone were suffering but it was not in their interest to be
euthanized, and they happened to be involved in a rights conflict, then we would have to respect their
right not to be harmed equally. Also, someone may simply volunteer to sacrifice themselves; this would
be a supererogatory act though, it would never be required of anyone, and only moral agents could make
such a decision.
Rights may not be able to protect individuals absolutely, but in order to protect them in a
way that adequately respects their inherent value, an important feature of rights is that they ought to
protect rights bearers from having their abilities or qualities play a role in our moral reasoning about
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who to harm. This suggestion offers a possible answer to the question of how rights can be prima facie,
and yet more than simply another consideration to be weighed amongst others in moral deliberations.
According to my view, rights offer a type of special protection that would never be overridden, even if
the rights themselves may be overridden and non-absolute. In this sense, it provides a way in which we
can respect the inherent value of individuals absolutely. We may never factor in an individual's qualities
to determine whose right to override, regardless of how critical the situation was. This characteristic of
rights is a plausible way of explaining how rights provide something distinct and meaningful to a moral
system. I agree with Regan that animals do have rights, though my goal has not been to defend this. If
animals do have basic rights, there is no non-arbitrary way to distinguish between the protection that
these rights afford humans versus animals. I have attempted to show that if animals do have inherent
value and basic rights, then they ought to be protected by the feature of rights that I have described.
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